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FROM LUJAN TO LAIDLAW:  A PRELIMINARY
MODEL OF ENVIRONMENTAL STANDING
MAXWELL L. STEARNS*
ABSTRACT
In the short span of eight years, the Supreme Court has issued two
seemingly opposite answers to the question of whether Congress has
free reign to provide private citizens with standing to redress violations
of federal environmental law, when those violations have not produced
any discernible harm to the claimants.  In his prior scholarship,
Professor Maxwell Stearns has developed a model of standing based
upon the theory of social choice, which focuses primarily upon
constitutional standing rules.  The recent doctrinal transformation from
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, to Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services, Inc., has provided a valuable opportunity for
Professor Stearns to expand his social choice model and to apply it in
the context of statutory standing.  In this article, which develops a
preliminary model of environmental standing, Professor Stearns
considers how bargaining over standing expands the issue spectrum for
legislative bargaining as it affects the optimal compliance level under a
proposed environmental statute. He then considers the differential
signaling value of a citizen suit versus agency enforcement as a proxy
for the optimal compliance level of the median member of the enacting
Congress.  The model of statutory standing, which grows out of this
analysis, provides several valuable insights into recent environmental
standing cases, and suggests a plausible means of reconciling Lujan
and Laidlaw.
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INTRODUCTION:  FRAMING THE INQUIRY
The Supreme Court’s standing doctrine has undergone a sea
change in the past three decades.  Initially conceived in the New Deal
as a presumptive set of rules that operated to limit federal judicial
interference with progressive regulatory programs,1 since the 1970s,
standing has been transformed into a constitutional litmus test in
virtually every civil federal court action.2 The Supreme Court now
demands as a precondition to litigating in federal court that each civil
claimant allege a demonstrable injury in fact, caused by the
defendant, that can meaningfully be redressed through judicial relief.3
The Court has applied these rules to presume against standing in
cases in which claimants seek to vindicate the claims of others; claims
that are diffuse; and claims that seek to invalidate an unconstitutional
or otherwise illegal market-distorting rule, which if corrected, will
produce more favorable market conditions.4
The various standing rules have provoked sharp controversy
within the legal academy.  Legal historians have convincingly
demonstrated that, as an historical matter, these relatively recent
standing rules have little or no foundation in either the framing
period or the earliest period of post-constitutional litigation.5  Legal
1. See generally Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and Problem of Self-
Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1446-47 (1988).
2. See id.  See also Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and
Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309 (1995) [hereinafter Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest];
Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 309
(1995) [hereinafter Stearns, Standing and Social Choice].
3. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737 (1984).
4. For a discussion that characterizes the Supreme Court’s standing decisions according to
the classifications set out in the text, see Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest, supra note 2;
Stearns, Standing and Social Choice, supra note 2; MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL
PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING ch. 6 (2000).
In the articles and in the book, I present the final category under the header “no right to an
undistorted market.”
5. Professor Gene Nichol has aptly summarized this literature, stating:
[i]n separate, major, and compelling efforts, Louis Jaffe in 1965, Raoul Berger in 1969,
and Steven Winter in 1988 have demonstrated that injury was not a requisite for
judicial authority in either the colonial, framing, or early constitutional periods.  The
Judiciary Act of 1789, like several contemporaneous state statutes, allowed “informer”
actions.  English practice included prerogative writs, mandamus, certiorari, and
prohibition, all designed to “restrain unlawful or abusive action by lower courts or
public agencies,” and requiring only “neglect of justice,” not individual injury.
Stranger suits and relator practice countenanced the assertion of judicial power
without the existence of a direct personal stake in the controversy.
Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L.J. 1141,
1151-52 (1993) (citations omitted); see also Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest, supra note 2,
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scholars have also argued that the various standing requirements
(most notably injury in fact, but more recently including
redressability)6 have proved sufficiently malleable, indeed
manipulable, as to justify seemingly inconsistent outcomes.  As a
result, scholars have argued that the standing rules appear to have
been motivated largely by political concerns, including the desire to
avoid deciding difficult cases, or the opposite, namely the desire to
issue a preliminary and low cost signal of likely future rulings.7
I have previously used the theory of social choice to develop a
model of standing, targeted primarily to the evolution of
constitutional standing rules.8  The social choice model explains the
conditions under which the Supreme Court transformed standing
from its New Deal roots into its present form.  The model is positive,
and is therefore not focused on providing a critique of present
doctrine.  Instead, it attempts to identify the dynamics of Supreme
Court decision making that created the doctrine.  In this article, I will
extend the model to explore some of the recent developments in
statutory standing.  To do so, I will first explain the relationship
between constitutional and statutory standing.
The model of constitutional standing, which is briefly
summarized in the first part of this article, reveals that standing is
inextricably linked to the doctrine of stare decisis.  Within the
framework of social choice, stare decisis can best be understood as a
rule that limits reconsideration of defeated alternatives.  Under
at 1327-28 n.69 (collecting authorities).
6. As explained in Part III, both Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services, Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000), and Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523
U.S. 83 (1998), present important questions of redressability.
7. For a summary of this literature, see Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest, supra note
2, at 1326-27 n.66 and cites therein.
8. See supra notes 2 and 4, and cites therein.  It is important to distinguish between
constitutional and prudential standing rules, on the one hand, and constitutional and statutory
standing, on the other.  Constitutional and prudential standing rules come into play in virtually
all standing cases, regardless of whether the cause of action arises under the Constitution or a
statute.  Congress has the power to override prudential, but not constitutional, constraints on
standing.  The term statutory standing is sometimes used to refer to Congress’s effort to confer
standing broadly by statute.  This can involve a pure question of statutory interpretation, for
example, whether the statute intended to confer standing upon the particular claimant on the
facts of the case.  In addition, in evaluating standing under a statute, the Court will look to
whether the claimant has satisfied the constitutional standing requirements.  In contrast, when a
claimant relies upon the Constitution for standing, the Court applies both its constitutional and
prudential standing rules.  As explained below, while the Court distinguishes between
constitutional and prudential standing rules, until recently it has employed a somewhat more
relaxed set of standards in evaluating even the constitutional minimum for standing when
Congress has clearly provided for standing by statute.
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specified conditions, with stare decisis in place, the order in which
cases are presented has the potential to affect not only on the timing
of doctrine, but also its substantive development.  This is prone to
occur when the preferences of the Supreme Court justices are
intransitive with respect to the dispositive issue and outcome
resolutions over two or more cases, and thus when there is no
available Condorcet winner.9  Within the Supreme Court, stare decisis
has the potential to render the evolution of constitutional doctrine
dependent upon the order, or path, of cases presented.  Under
specified conditions, described below,10 case A followed by case B has
the potential to produce opposite results from case B followed by
case A.  Stare decisis thus provides a powerful incentive to ideological
interest groups to try to manipulate the order of case decisions in the
federal judiciary generally, and in the Supreme Court in particular.
The Supreme Court’s articulated standing rules have the effect of
significantly limiting the power of litigants to exert a disproportionate
influence over doctrine by picking and choosing cases to affect the
critical path of doctrinal development.  While the resulting doctrine
remains path dependent (meaning that the order of cases continues to
influence the evolution of doctrine with standing in place), standing
improves the overall fairness of constitutional law making by
grounding that path in fortuitous factors presumptively beyond the
control of the litigants themselves. The social choice model also
explains that unlike the Supreme Court, Congress has the
institutional wherewithal to avoid undue path manipulation by
deflecting certain questions for which no adequate legislative
consensus has yet formed.  That is because Congress has superior
mechanisms for avoiding the forced resolution of issues that give rise
to intransitive preferences.  These include both the power to remain
inert and the power to commodify preferences through vote trading
and logrolling.  As a result, many potential intransitivities in Congress
are of relatively little consequence.  Within this framework, we can
understand the Court’s constitutional standing rules as facilitating the
choice of forum for the resolution of certain issues, based upon the
relative decision making competence of the federal judiciary, on the
one hand, and Congress, on the other.
The Supreme Court’s evolving doctrine of statutory standing,
and especially environmental standing, at least as it has developed
9. A Condorcet winner is a non-majority candidate that will defeat all other candidates in
direct binary comparisons.  For a more detailed discussion, see infra Part I.
10. See infra Part I.
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since 1992, however, presents a considerable anomaly.  In my prior
work, I have joined the growing chorus of scholars, several of whom
were involved with this symposium, who are highly critical of the
Court’s sudden departure from a more relaxed set of standards when
plaintiffs have relied for standing upon a federal statute.11  The social
choice model of constitutional standing rests upon the intuition that
the Court will be disinclined to allow ideological litigants to select
cases as the vehicle for exerting a disproportionate influence over
developing doctrine when the resulting law might be the product of
path dependent, and thus arbitrary, decision making.  By limiting
judicial law making in this manner, standing preserves the power of
Congress to resolve the underlying issues if and when it develops an
appropriate consensus.  The anomaly of modern statutory standing is
that when litigants rely for standing upon a federal statute, they
appear to be relying upon the product of the very legislative
consensus that the constitutional standing doctrines are designed to
facilitate.  Thus, when Congress confers standing upon a private
attorney general, but the Court denies that person standing, the Court
is preserving Congress’s power to achieve a legislative consensus in
the future by thwarting its legislative consensus achieved in the past.
And yet, that is precisely the direction in which the Lujan Court had
moved statutory standing doctrine.
While the Court has long required that plaintiffs be among the
injured,12 the Court had generally applied a more relaxed conception
of injury when the claimant relied for standing upon a federal statute
than when she relied instead upon the Constitution.13  The critical
11. I must express a mild disagreement with one point raised in Professor Karl S. Coplan’s
excellent essay, Direct Environmental Standing for Chartered Conservation Corporations, in
which he asserts that neither Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990), nor
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), “represented a dramatic departure from
previous environmental standing doctrine on their facts; after all the [Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727 (1972)] decision had long ago required that the environmental plaintiffs be ‘among the
injured.’”  See Karl S. Coplan, Direct Environmental Standing for Chartered Conservation
Corporations, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 183 (2001).  While it is true that Morton specified
the stated requirement, until Lujan, the Court appeared substantially more willing to allow
Congress considerable latitude in defining the nature of a justiciable injury for purposes of
satisfying its constitutional standing requirements.  Morton itself recognized aesthetic, as well as
pocketbook, injuries, when Congress provided redress of that injury by statute.  But by limiting
the power of Congress to define justiciable injuries in a novel manner, Lujan presented a
dramatic departure from prior standing law, including Morton.
12. See Morton, 405 U.S. at 732-33; see also Coplan, supra note 11, at 10.
13. For examples in which the Supreme Court has allowed liberal standing based upon the
Fair Housing Act, see Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373-74 (1982); Gladstone,
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109-15 (1979); Village of Arlington Heights v.
II - FROM LUJAN TO LAIDLAW - A PRELIMINARY MODEL - STEARNS.DOC 05/09/01  1:54 PM
326 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 11:321
point of departure was the 1992 decision, Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife.14  In Lujan, the Court denied standing to claimants who
sought to enforce the procedural requirements of the Endangered
Species Act, and who relied for standing upon a provision that
allowed for enforcement by private attorneys general.  Until that
case, the Court had generally adopted a deferential stance in allowing
Congress to define novel injuries and even in allowing plaintiffs to
advance claims that intuitively belonged to others.  While the Court
had distinguished its prudential and constitutional standing
requirements, suggesting that Congress could avoid the former, but
not the latter, until Lujan, the Court had provided Congress with the
latitude to define the critical standing elements more broadly than
when a claimant relied for standing solely upon the Constitution, or
the Administrative Procedure Act (as opposed to a statute affording
substantive rights).15  In contrast, the Lujan Court insisted that when a
claimant relies upon the broadly worded citizen standing provision of
the Endangered Species Act, she must allege an injury that, if not
identical, is closely analogous to one recognized at common law.  In
short, the Lujan Court suggested that with respect to the question of
injury, Congress lacks the power to opt out of its literally enforced
constitutional standing requirements.
Not only did Lujan meet with a flurry of academic criticism,16 but
also it provoked sharp criticism within the Court.  While the Court
has issued several interim decisions,17 its most important statement on
Congress’s power to confer standing by statute was recently
announced in  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services, Inc.18  The Laidlaw Court afforded standing under the Clean
Water Act for the failure of a polluter to comply with the
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 (1977); Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972).
14. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
15. The point was perhaps most clearly made in Justice Marshall’s well known assertion
that “Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing,
even though no injury would exist without the statute.”  Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,
617 n.3 (1973).
16. See, e.g., Nichol, supra note 5; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife:
Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170 (1993); Cass R.
Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?  Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 163 (1992).  I too have been critical of Lujan.  See Stearns, Standing and Social Choice,
supra note 2.  For a contrary view, see Marshall J. Breger, Defending Defenders: Remarks on
Nichol and Pierce, 42 DUKE L.J. 1201 (1993).
17. For a discussion of some of these decisions, see infra Part III.
18. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
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requirements of an emissions permit, and did so even though the
individual claims of injury seemed no more concrete, and the
prospect of meaningful redress seemed no less remote, than in
Lujan.19  In a short span of just eight years, the Court appears to have
issued a major retrenchment upon Lujan’s logic, if not its holding.20
As much as Lujan has been vilified, Laidlaw appears poised to be
commended as a restoration of sound principles of standing.  And yet,
as with Lujan, one is hard pressed to predict whether Laidlaw
represents a final and stable solution to the difficult questions that
statutory standing cases have posed in recent years.
While the Supreme Court has recently addressed statutory
standing in other contexts,21 the most recent major skirmishes over
statutory standing have been fought on the environmental
battleground.  This might not be surprising.  As Justice Scalia, who
authored the majority opinion in Lujan,22 later observed (admittedly
with some irony), the environment is  “a matter in which it is common
to think all persons have an interest.”23  Among the major questions
that environmental standing cases present is the power of Congress to
confer standing upon all persons to redress violations of federal
environmental law, even when the claimants have suffered no injury
distinct from the harm to the public at large as a result of those
violations.  That was among the central issues in both Lujan and
Laidlaw.  The doctrinal teeter-totter on statutory standing has likely
occurred on the environmental playing field because such doctrinal
elements as injury, causation, and redressability are most susceptible
to competing intuitions in that context.
19. As explained in Part III, Laidlaw was initially conceived as a mootness case.
20. For an attempt at reconciling the case holdings, see infra Part III.  Even if one were to
accept the argument that the two cases can be technically reconciled, the fact remains that they
are in great tension, and together do not create a likely stable resolution to the difficulties
associated with statutory standing.
21. In Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997), for example, the Supreme Court denied
standing to Senator Byrd and others to challenge the constitutionality of the Line-Item Veto
Act, which it later held unconstitutional in Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
And in Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998), the Supreme Court allowed
citizen standing to force the disclosure of the contribution list for the American Israel Public
Affairs Committee (AIPAC), on the ground that it was a campaign organization, even though
the claimed injury does not appear to have met the strict requirements of concreteness set out in
some of the then-most recent statutory standing cases.
22. With the exception of Part III.B, which was for a plurality of four, the remainder of
Justice Scalia’s Lujan opinion was joined by a majority.
23. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 124, 165 (1997).
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If the Supreme Court has developed its constitutional standing
doctrine in a manner that preserves the power of Congress, which is
better suited to resolve intransitive preference orderings, to regulate
if and when it achieves an appropriate level of consensus, the most
recent standing cases demand a further extension of the model.  This
article will provide a preliminary sketch of such a model.  The
extended model begins with the intuitions developed from the social
choice model of constitutional standing.  It then identifies the
conditions that likely generate broadly worded statutory standing
provisions and the concerns that the resulting regime poses for
judicial construction.  My objective is not to provide a normative
critique, or to argue that one or the other of Lujan and Laidlaw is
necessarily wrong.  Instead, my objective is to provide a positive
model that exposes the tradeoffs that these and other environmental
standing cases present, and to explain why neither of those cases
necessarily presents a stable solution.
This article will develop three insights into the law of statutory
standing.  First, the model reveals that the Supreme Court is likely
motivated in its analysis of statutory standing by two competing
intuitions.  On the one hand, the justices seek to defer to legislative
consensus, at least inasmuch as that consensus signals the preferred
resolution of such difficult questions as compliance obligations and
optimal enforcement level.  On the other hand, broad statutory
standing provisions might evince avoidance, rather than resolution, of
these very questions.  So viewed, broad standing provisions are
analogous to once-illicit delegations to administrative agencies of
lawmaking powers, without the requisite “intelligible principle.”24 The
unusual feature of this form of delegation is that the object of the
delegation is private citizens working through the federal judiciary,
rather than a lawmaking agency.  The Court’s rejection of citizen
standing thus reflects a concern that the citizen suit might promote an
unanticipated level of enforcement, even assuming no technical
departure from the specified compliance requirements, if the
benchmark for optimal enforcement is the probable preference of the
median member of the enacting Congress.  So viewed, the divergence
between the level of regulatory enforcement and citizen-suit
enforcement might signal a likely departure from the contemplated
enforcement level of the median member of the enacting Congress.
In response to these divergent signals, the Court imposes stricter
24. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
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standing limits as a means to hedge against overly zealous
enforcement, while allowing for the future possibility of a legislative
corrective in the form of a statutory amendment or of more ambitious
regulatory agency enforcement under the existing statutory scheme.
Second, the model explains why a federal regulatory agency that
itself would signal a less ambitious level of enforcement than would
those bringing the citizen suits, might nonetheless support citizen
standing. As citizen standing comes to be regarded by business
interests as overly zealous relative to agency enforcement, the effect
is to increase support for agency enforcement, not merely among pro-
environmental interests who we might expect to see supporting
agency enforcement, but also by interest groups who generally seek
to limit the reach of environmental regulation.25  The agency, which
would often prefer more zealous enforcement, is able to encourage
this result by endorsing citizen standing, while focusing on its own
more moderate enforcement objectives.
Finally, the model provides insights with which to evaluate some
historical arguments concerning the constitutional legitimacy of strict
judicial limits upon statutory standing.  The analysis reveals that the
early equity actions that appear to have defied modern standing
norms were likely the product of motivations that set them quite
apart from many, and perhaps most, of the modern citizen standing
suits.  Early exceptions to these norms were likely the product of
restrictive prosecutorial resources and information asymmetries with
respect to local injuries resulting from violations of law.  In contrast,
modern statutory standing allows the private vindication of claims
that the enforcement agency has chosen not to pursue for policy
reasons, even after receiving the required notice by the would-be
private attorney general and being afforded an opportunity to litigate
in her place.  As a result, early cases that defy modern justiciability
norms might be of limited value in assessing the conditions under
which the Court has recently developed its statutory standing rules.
In Part I, I will briefly summarize the social choice model of
constitutional standing, which provides the starting point for
analyzing statutory standing.  In Part II, I will develop a preliminary
model of statutory standing.  Finally, in Part III, I will consider five
25. The recent campaign by the National Rifle Association (NRA) to see that present gun
laws get enforced is analogous.  While the NRA has lobbied against many, if not most, of the
very laws that it now claims are under-enforced, the campaign likely rests upon the premise that
prosecutorial enforcement of existing laws holds greater promise for moderation than does the
creation of new gun control laws.
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recent statutory standing cases—four involving environmental
standing, and one involving standing to challenge the Line-Item Veto
Act—based upon the insights developed from these two models.
I.  THE SOCIAL CHOICE MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL
STANDING
The social choice model of standing begins with the seminal
insight that under specified conditions, groups of three or more
persons each possessing fully transitive (rational) preference
orderings, may possess intransitive (irrational) preferences by
unlimited majority rule.  While we generally assume transitivity of
preferences (A preferred to B preferred to C implies A preferred to
C) as a precondition to individual rationality, we cannot make the
same assumption with respect to groups of three or more decision
makers.  If three persons are selecting among options ABC, and each
ranks his preferences as follows: 1 (ABC); 2 (BCA); and 3 (CAB), an
intransitivity exists, such that in a regime of unlimited binary
comparisons in which we assume sincere voting, the group as a whole
prefers A to B (persons 1 and 3 winning) and B to C (persons 1 and 2
winning), but not C to A (persons 2 and 3 winning).  This
phenomenon is not universal.  Thus, if the preferences were instead: 1
(ABC); 2 (BCA); and 3 (CBA), such that only the second and third
ordinal ranking of person 3 had been changed, then option B would
represent a stable and dominant outcome that could defeat both A
and C in direct comparisons.  In the language of social choice, option
B is known as a Condorcet winner.
Because the Supreme Court is a multimember institution, which
presently has nine justices, one can posit conditions under which its
members are susceptible of possessing collective intransitive
preferences.  While I have previously provided illustrations based
upon actual cases,26 I will now illustrate using a hypothetical and
stylized pair of environmental standing cases.
Imagine that the Court faces two cases presenting difficult
questions of statutory standing, Citizens for Clean Water v. Polluters,
Co. and Citizens for Clean Air v. Emissions, Inc.  Assume that at the
district court level, both cases were dismissed on the ground that the
plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate any direct injury resulting from
26. See Stearns, Standing and Social Choice, supra note 2, at 323-27 (illustrating with
Crawford v. Board. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982) and Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1,
458 U.S. 457 (1982)).
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the defendants’ stipulated permit violations.  As a result, the lower
courts denied the plaintiffs standing, and the respective courts of
appeals affirmed.  The first case, Clean Water, involves a statutory
standing provision that is slightly broader than that at issue in the
second, Clean Air.  The former confers standing to “all persons,”
while the latter provides it to “injured persons.”  Further assume that
the two cases are sufficiently close on the facts and on the law that
only a minority of three justices, group A, believes that they should
be distinguished.  Imagine that another group of three justices, group
B, believes that the two cases are indistinguishable and that both
should be reversed, thus allowing standing.  And a final group of
three justices, group C, agrees that the cases are indistinguishable, but
concludes that both should be affirmed, thus continuing to deny
standing.
Based upon these assumptions, any two of the three groups of
justices contain the requisite number of votes to form a majority.
Assume that the two cases arrive at the Supreme Court at the same
time.  Further assume that group A concludes that because the statute
at issue in Clean Water confers standing more broadly than that at
issue in Clean Air, standing should have been granted in Clean Air,
resulting in a reversal, but not in Clean Water, resulting in an
affirmance.  Group B believes that standing is sufficiently strong
under either statute, and that the pervasive interest in the
environment renders any concerned citizen “affected” when federal
environmental law is violated.  Thus, group B concludes that both
dismissals should be reversed.  Finally, group C reaches conclusions
opposite group B in both cases.  Group C believes that because the
stipulated permit violations produced no actual harm to the plaintiffs
in either case, any hypothesized “affect,” psychological or otherwise,
is inadequate to justify standing.  Group C would affirm in both cases.
Because these two cases arise simultaneously, assume that the justices
vote consistently with their preferred resolution in each case, and thus
without regard to how the other case is resolved.  In other words,
because the two cases are decided simultaneously, none of the justices
is assumed to treat one case as a precedent in the other.  In this
situation, the result will be to reverse the dismissal in Clean Air, with
groups A and B forming a majority, and to affirm the dismissal in
Clean Water, with groups A and C forming a majority.  This holds,
even though groups B and C form a thwarted majority that believes
that there is no distinction between the two cases.
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Now assume that the cases come up one year apart, rather than
at the same time.  If Clean Air is decided first, the dismissal of
standing will again be reversed, with groups A and B forming a
majority.  When Clean Water comes up the following year, those
justices who thought the cases indistinguishable (the members of
groups B and C), will not inquire how they might rule on the merits of
the case in the absence of a governing precedent.  Instead, they will
inquire as to whether Clean Air is controlling.  Assuming that the
justices vote sincerely,27 then based upon their resolution of this
limited and potentially controlling question,28 they will then form a
majority to reverse the dismissal in Clean Water.
Finally, assume that the cases arise in opposite order.  If Clean
Water is decided first, the standing dismissal will be affirmed, with
groups A and C forming a majority.  Subject to the same assumptions,
when Clean Air arises the following year, groups B and C, which
determine that Clean Water is a controlling precedent in Clean Air,
will affirm that case as well.
In these two variations on the initial hypothetical, the outcomes
of both cases depended fully upon the order in which they were
presented.  In social choice, this phenomenon arises when, as here, a
group of decision makers possesses intransitive preferences and the
rules disallow the requisite number of comparisons to formally codify
a cycle.29  The intransitivity is highlighted when we identify the three
overlapping majorities across these two cases that cannot
simultaneously be satisfied:
Groups A and B: reverse Clean Air
Groups A and C: affirm Clean Water
Groups B and C: (affirm Clean Water and Clean Air) or
(reverse Clean Water and Clean Air)
Because only two of the three majorities can be satisfied at any
27. In the language of social choice, the justices are presumed to adhere to independence
of irrelevant alternatives, which is one of the Arrow’s Theorem fairness conditions.  See
STEARNS, supra note 4, at ch. 2.  Independence demands that the participants vote strictly
according to the merits of available alternatives, without regard to such extrinsic matters as the
voting path.  It was also a condition that Condorcet assumed in his writing on the paradox of
voting.  See Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J.
1219 (1994) (describing the significance of principled voting for both Arrow and Condorcet).
28. If resolved affirmatively, then it is controlling.  If resolved negatively, then it is not
controlling because the justices must decide Clean Water on its merits.
29. To ensure that the selected outcome is a Condorcet winner, or to discover the existence
of a cycle, the decision-making body must allow at least the same number of binary comparisons
as options.  Otherwise, the selected outcome might be the arbitrary product of a voting path.
See STEARNS, supra note 4, at ch. 2.
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one time, the combination of preferences allows us to infer
intransitive preferences, such that for any resolution, there exists a
dissatisfied majority that would prefer to substitute that resolution
with another.  In this case, the intransitivity arises because it is not
possible to satisfy the first two majorities, which would decide the
cases in opposite fashion, while also satisfying the third majority,
which would decide them the same way.
While the written opinions and the votes cast in such paired
comparisons allow us to make assumptions from which we can
reasonably infer lurking intransitive preferences, when the cases arise
separately, stare decisis prevents the formal codification of a doctrinal
cycle, in which for any chosen outcome or set of outcomes, another
has majority support.30  Thus, if the cases were decided one after the
other and if we assume principled voting and adherence to precedent,
then those deciding the second case would limit their inquiry to the
narrow question whether the first case governs the second.  If the
answer is yes, that answer will be controlling in the second case,
without regard to how this group would have decided the second case
on its merits.  In effect, stare decisis limits one of the options from
consideration once a governing precedent has been decided.  The
stare decisis regime produces the benign effect of improving the
stability of legal doctrine.  At the same time, however, it produces the
unintended consequence of rendering the substantive evolution of
doctrine in the two cases dependent upon the order in which they are
presented.  In a legal system that adheres to precedent, the
phenomenon of path dependency is inevitable, at least when the
judges possess intransitive preferences as in this hypothetical.  Even
though the Court might have decided the second case differently
absent a controlling precedent, those who view the two cases as
indistinguishable will eschew a formal and controlling inquiry into the
merits of the second case.31  It is only by allowing a formal and
controlling consideration of the now foreclosed merits determination
in the second case that the Court would risk codifying a voting cycle.
While this example involved only two cases, I have previously
provided several examples of important bodies of substantive
constitutional law that have evolved in path dependent fashion
30. Over a large enough number of cases, it is possible for doctrinal cycles to emerge, even
with stare decisis in place.  See id. at ch. 4.
31. That is not to suggest that the justices will decline to express noncontrolling views on
the merits of the second case in the form of dictum.  But by definition dictum is not the product
of a formal and controlling inquiry.
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through a series of discrete distinctions over a larger set of cases and
over a longer period of years.32  Introducing additional variables,
including changes in Court personnel, changes in political conditions,
and more complicated background precedent, increases the difficulty
of formalizing any presentation of path dependency.33  Nonetheless,
the presence of multiple factors does not undermine the main point:
Even if we assume these other factors away, and imagine a regime in
which the Court has stable personnel and confronts minimal
background precedent, stare decisis creates a strong incentive among
ideological interest groups to try to manipulate the critical path of
case decisions as a means to exert a disproportionate impact on the
substantive evolution of doctrine.  Adding variables that improve the
likelihood of success in producing this result serves to enhance, rather
than to undermine, this already powerful incentive.34
While stare decisis introduces an arbitrary element into the
evolution of legal doctrine, the real problem with stare decisis is not
path dependence.35  Path dependence is an inevitable byproduct in a
regime that seeks to use precedent as a means with which to produce
stable legal doctrine.  The greater difficulty is that stare decisis creates
a strong incentive among interest groups to try to favorably
manipulate the order of case decisions as a vehicle for exerting a
disproportionate influence over the evolution of substantive doctrine.
Thus, revisiting the prior hypothetical, if a pro-environmental group
had complete control of the order of cases, it would present Clean Air
first, on the ground that its more restrictive standing provision is
32. See Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest, supra note 2; STEARNS, supra note 4, ch. 4.
Intransitivities can also be disclosed through dictum both within individual cases and in groups
of cases over time.  For some individual case illustrations, see Maxwell L. Stearns, Should
Justices Ever Switch Votes?: Miller v. Albright in Social Choice Perspective, 7 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 87 (1999).
33. For a discussion of the role of case distinctions in affecting the path dependence and
manipulation of legal doctrine, see STEARNS, supra note 4, at ch. 4.
34. As I have previously explained, the Supreme Court’s power to control its docket
through certiorari jurisdiction does not limit the need for standing doctrine.  See STEARNS,
supra note 4, at ch. 4 (developing social choice model of certiorari, standing, and issue
percolation).  Instead, the Court must have both certiorari and standing to limit the most
egregious manifestations of path manipulation.  Absent standing, ideological interest groups
could manipulate circuit splits as a means to effectively force the grant of certiorari, rendering
docket control illusory.  Absent certiorari, the Court would have to devise some rule that would
force it to take cases whenever some predetermined benchmark has been met, for example, a
circuit split.  If we assume that the legal doctrine develops in a path dependent manner in the
circuit courts, as well as in the Supreme Court, then this would prevent the Court from awaiting
a sufficient number of arbitrary, path dependent options from which to choose.
35. See Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest, supra note 2.
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easier to defend than is the completely open-ended provision at issue
in Clean Water.  A pro-industry group seeking to limit the application
of citizen standing, in contrast, would take the opposite approach,
with opposite results.
It will now be helpful to consider the nature of the Supreme
Court’s articulated standing rules, which combine to raise the cost of
path manipulation.  As stated in the introduction, the Court’s
standing cases can be divided into three general groupings: 1) no right
to enforce the rights of others; 2) no right to prevent diffuse harms;
and 3) no right to an undistorted market.  The first two categories are
most important in considering the question of statutory standing.
These two rules limit path manipulation by presumptively preventing
the easiest vehicles for favorably ordering cases.  The third category
proves helpful in assessing the Court’s recent analyses of
redressability.
A.  No Right to Enforce the Rights of Others or to Prevent Diffuse
Harms
The easiest way to manipulate the order of presently live claims,
as opposed to claims that are not yet ripe or that are moot,36 is to
identify available claims that affect other people, and then raise them
on their behalf.37  This would allow ideological interest groups to
litigate the most favorable live claims first, and then to use the
resulting precedents in an effort to work toward preferred resolutions
of cases with increasingly difficult facts or law.  If the judiciary
presumes against allowing such claims on the ground that the affected
individual should pursue his or her own claim, the ideological litigant
can then take a second mode of attack.  He or she can instead allege
that the suit does not seek to vindicate the claim of another person.
Rather, by knowing the law has been violated, he or she is suffering a
harm, albeit one that is diffuse.38  This analytical play on words, which
36. Thus viewed, ripeness and mootness doctrines prevent even lower cost mechanisms for
favorably ordering cases.  Litigating nonripe or moot claims would not even require identifying
a live dispute.  See STEARNS, supra note 4, at ch. 4 & 6.
37. This was the articulated defect in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), namely
that none of the club’s members were actually affected by the alleged violations of federal
environmental laws, because none had used the parks in question.  In contrast, in United States
v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973), a group
of claimants was able to raise a seemingly similar claim merely by alleging that the failure to
suspend a railroad rate increase adversely affected the air that they breathed in and around
Washington, D.C.
38. Indeed, this might appear to provide an apt characterization of the facts of both Lujan
and Laidlaw.
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transforms a third party harm into a first party injury, would suffice to
create standing but for the presumptive rule that proscribes standing
to litigate diffuse harms.39  Together, these two rules operate fairly
well in directing courts to hear cases that are presumptively motivated
by the desire to resolve concrete disputes even if doing so requires the
courts to make new law, rather than by the desire to create law in
spite of the absence of a concrete dispute adversely affecting the
claimant.
The analysis thus far helps to explain two features of modern
standing doctrine.  First, while many commentators have observed
that the various standing elements are sometimes applied in an
inconsistent manner, we can now intuit the essential logic of including
such elements as injury in fact, causation, and redressability as
constitutional prerequisites to standing.  Each serves as a proxy for
the conditions under which courts are ordinarily called upon to
resolve disputes, and in the course of doing so, to occasionally make
new law.  In contrast, the Supreme Court intuits that suits that fail to
possess these characteristic features are more likely the product of an
ideological litigant’s desire to favorably manipulate the order of case
decisions as a vehicle for exerting a disproportionate influence over
the evolution of legal doctrine, even if there is no concrete dispute in
immediate need of judicial resolution.  In other words, while the
Court presumes it proper to resolve concrete disputes in spite of the
need to make law, it presumes it improper to resolve created disputes
as a purposeful vehicle to make new law.
1.  The Zealous Advocacy Anomaly
The analysis further explains why the law presumes against
allowing interest groups to have standing on their own, rather than as
conduits for the interests of specific members.40  For critics of
39. The rule is presumptive, rather than absolute, because under certain conditions,
Congress has succeeded in conferring the power to present claims of others and claims that are
diffuse.  See supra note 13 and cites therein (collecting Fair Housing Act cases).
40. In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977),
the Court articulated the following three-part test for organizational standing:
[An] association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its
members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it
seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in
the lawsuit.
Thus, the Washington Apple Advertising Commission was afforded standing to represent the
interests of its member producers who were allegedly harmed by the North Carolina law under
review, which prevented posting non-USDA grading, thus precluding superior Washington
grading to be posted on apple imports, because the members would have independently
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standing, this presents the following anomaly: While the Court, and
some commentators, have linked the constitutional standing
requirements to the desire for zealous advocacy,41 the interest groups
themselves would generally present the claims at least as zealously as
an adversely affected individual.  And yet, unless an individual
member would have standing, the organization cannot present the
claim.  The social choice model of standing readily explains this
anomaly.  If the function of standing is to limit the judicial creation of
law to those instances in which the resolution of a legal dispute
demands it, rather than in response to well timed litigation, then the
Court will prefer an actual litigant to an organizational litigant,
without regard to the relative litigational competence of the potential
claimants.  Otherwise, organizations like the Sierra Club Legal
Defense Fund, which have the resources with which to monitor
violations of the federal environmental laws, would be able to pick
and choose which cases to bring, and in what order, with the ultimate
goal of providing the maximum environmental protection under those
laws.  Under such a regime, the federal judiciary, including the
Supreme Court, might unwittingly expand the reach of federal
environmental statutes well beyond that which a majority of the
enacting Congress would have preferred had Congress addressed and
resolved the issue of the optimal level of enforcement, rather than
avoiding this question in part through the mechanism of liberalized
standing.42
Among the benefits of a regime that imposes barriers to third
party or diffuse harm standing is that it does not prevent the
enforcement agency from pursuing a more ambitious level of
enforcement in the future.  Nor does it preclude Congress from
tightening enforcement relative to that presently undertaken by the
agency.  If, at some future time, Congress possesses the requisite
consensus with which to require a stricter level of enforcement, or
satisfied the Court’s standing requirements.  Yet, five years earlier, in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727 (1972), the Court denied Sierra Club standing to challenge a development, where it
claimed no members who had been or would be harmed as a result of the challenged project.
41. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 413-14 (1991); Secretary of State v. Joseph H.
Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956 (1984); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 194 (1976); see also Craig R.
Gottlieb, Comment, How Standing Has Fallen: The Need to Separate Constitutional and
Prudential Concerns, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1063, 1071 (1994) (arguing that the only constitutional
basis for standing is the need to ensure zealous advocacy); cf. Arthur H. Abel, Note, The Burger
Court’s Unified Approach to Standing and Its Impact on Congressional Plaintiffs, 60 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1187, 1189 (1985) (observing that in the Warren Court, the standing doctrine was
largely grounded in the desire to promote vigorous advocacy).
42. This argument is more fully developed infra Part II.
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with which to impose stricter compliance obligations, a prior standing
denial will not prevent it from doing so.
One of the benefits of decision making in Congress, relative to
the federal courts, is that Congress need not resolve issues over which
opinions are sharply divided and for which there is no consensus in
the form of a Condorcet winner.  Congress has the power to remain
inert.  Social choice thus reveals a critical distinction between the
Supreme Court, or appellate courts generally, and Congress, when
those institutions are confronted with certain controversial issues.43
Setting aside the possibility of a rare dismissal on the ground that
certiorari was improvidently granted, and assuming that a case is
properly on the Court’s docket, the Court is presumed obligated to
resolve the case by a collective judgment.  As a result, it has
developed a set of decision making rules that are consistent with that
obligation.  The Court thus lacks the institutional power with which to
employ rules that would formalize cyclical preferences and thus
provide a foundation for failing to issue a collective judgment.44
In contrast, if Congress is confronted with a variety of proposed
solutions to an identified problem in the form of competing bills or of
competing amendments to a pending bill, and if none of those is a
Condorcet winner, then Congress retains the power to identify the
cycle and then to decline to act.45  Unlike appellate courts, Congress
possesses the institutional power to remain inert.  Perhaps more
importantly, even if members of Congress reveal the presence of
cyclical preferences, Congress retains one additional means of
43. For a more detailed comparison of Congress and the Supreme Court from a social
choice perspective, see Stearns, supra note 27; STEARNS, supra note 4, at ch. 2.
44. In the language of social choice, this means that the Court lacks the power to employ
rules that can ensure that a Condorcet winner, if available, will prevail.  For a more detailed
exposition and analysis of this point, see STEARNS, supra note 4, at ch. 2.  This does not mean, of
course, that the Court is bound to issue a holding on an issue of the litigants’ choosing.  It
merely means that appellate courts in general, including the Supreme Court, cannot decline to
resolve by judgment disputes for which it lacks a preferred, Condorcet winning outcome over
issue and outcome combinations within or across cases.
45. Even if Congress has rules that promote structure-induced equilibria—for example
restrictions on the number of amendments to pending bills—members of Congress have the
means with which to identify potential intransitivities informally through agreements to trade
votes.  See William H. Riker, The Paradox of Voting and Congressional Rules for Voting
Amendments, 52 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 349 (1958) (describing potential effect of limited number
of permissible amendments to motions in Congress as masking cyclical preferences); see also
MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY ch.
2:1 (1997).  As a result, members can avoid reaching collective decisions by agreeing on
strategies to limit disfavored voting paths.  For a discussion of structure-induced equilibria, see
Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, 37
PUB. CHOICE 503 (1981).
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arriving at a rational outcome.  Unlike appellate courts, Congress
condones vote trading, or logrolling.  This practice allows Congress to
relegate many potential intransitivities to an inconsequential status.
Provided that the members possess disparate intensities of
preference, they have the wherewithal to reach a collective resolution
by expanding the issue space to include a larger package of issues,
even when preferences regarding one or more of these issues are
cyclical.  In contrast, in the Supreme Court vote trading is widely
understood to be an improper mechanism for case resolution.46
Moreover, various institutional rules within the Supreme Court,
including most notably the practice of written opinions, inhibit vote
trading, by encouraging statements of justification for a given vote,
which would be contradicted if justices were then to vote differently
based solely upon strategic considerations.47
These institutional distinctions between the Supreme Court and
Congress prove significant in assessing standing.  The effect of a
regime in which the justices are presumed obligated to resolve
individual disputes properly before them and to adhere to precedent
when a new case falls within the ambit of a previously announced
holding, is sometimes to thwart the preferences of an existing
majority on the Court.  Thwarted majorities can arise within a single
case,48 or through path dependence, over groups of cases over time.49
The two standing rules described thus far—no right to enforce the
rights of others and no right to prevent diffuse harms—have the
beneficial effect of encouraging the resolution of divisive issues in
Congress, a branch that has a comparative advantage in the
resolution of issues even when its members possess intransitive
preferences.50
46. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE
L.J. 82, 88 (1986) (“[W]e . . . strongly lean toward a view of adjudication as an exercise in
judgment aggregation; indeed, we understand most plausible schools of jurisprudence to
embrace this view.”).
47. See STEARNS, supra note 4, at ch. 4.
48. See Stearns, Standing Back From the Forest, supra note 2 (collecting and classifying
individual voting anomaly cases).
49. See STEARNS, supra note 4, at ch. 4 (collecting cases).
50. This does not necessarily mean that all controversial issues will be—or should be—
resolved in the legislature.  Indeed, in virtually all difficult criminal appeals resting upon a
claimed constitutional defect, the appellate courts are called upon to create new law in a manner
that risks thwarting majoritarian legislative preferences.  In this context, however, while the
courts might be disadvantaged by collective preference aggregation problems, they have a
comparative advantage relative to the legislature, in that they have the wherewithal to issue a
decision even if they possess cyclical preferences.  If appellate courts were not obligated to
resolve disputes in this manner, it would be possible for a convicted criminal to remain in prison
II - FROM LUJAN TO LAIDLAW - A PRELIMINARY MODEL - STEARNS.DOC 05/09/01  1:54 PM
340 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 11:321
B.  No Right to an Undistorted Market
Before concluding this part, it will be helpful to briefly consider
the final constitutional standing rule, no right to an undistorted
market.  The analysis will be helpful in assessing the Supreme Court’s
recent standing decisions, Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better
Environment, and Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services, Inc.  I will first describe the general posture of the standing
cases in this category, and then summarize two such cases in which
the Court achieved opposite outcomes on standing.
In each case in this category, the claimant identifies a law or
regulatory policy, which she alleges violates either a statute or a
constitutional provision.  The most notable examples involve alleged
violations of equal protection.  The allegedly illegal rule can take, for
example, the form of an IRS operating policy, as in Allen v. Wright,51
or an affirmative action program, as in Board of Regents v. Bakke.52
The claimant alleges that if the illegal rule were struck down, then
through a series of causal linkages, she would ultimately benefit.  In
Allen, for example, a nationwide group of parents of African-
American school children challenged an IRS policy that, among other
things, afforded private schools tax exempt status based upon that of
any umbrella organization of which they were a part.  The claimants
alleged that in some instances, the schools receiving tax exempt status
based upon this policy were engaging in racially discriminatory
admissions policies.  As a result, they alleged, if these schools were
assessed on their own merits, they would have been denied tax
exempt status.  The claimants thus sought to have the tax policy
struck down as a means to remove an unconstitutional subsidy to
white flight, and thus to improve the possibility of racial integration at
the public schools that their children attended.  The Allen majority
denied standing, concluding that the plaintiffs had failed to articulate
a constitutionally adequate injury. The Allen Court observed first that
the claimants’ children had not applied for admission into, and were
not attending, the private discriminatory schools in question, and
second that  multiple links in the chain of causation made speculative
without a resolution of a claimed constitutional defect simply because the members of the Court
identified the presence of cyclical preferences.  In contrast, a legislature can routinely allow
constitutional violations, or other societal problems, to persist without issuing any corrective
unless and until it achieves an appropriate level of consensus.  In fact, as Justice O’Connor
recognized, albeit in the context of a state legislature, the power to remain inert is among the
legislature’s inherent powers.  See generally New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
51. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
52. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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whether a decision to strike down the policy would lead to the actual
integration of the public schools.53
In contrast, in Bakke, a nonminority applicant alleged that a
race-based quota system for affirmative action violated equal
protection.  As in Allen, his ultimate relief—admission to medical
school—was dependent upon a host of causal linkages involving
decisions by private actors who were not party to the suit.54  Thus
even without the affirmative action program in place, Bakke could
not have known that he would have been among the next group of
nonminority admittees.  But unlike in Allen, the Bakke Court granted
standing on the theory that Bakke was injured in his inability to
compete for all seats.
These two cases illustrate an inevitable tension in the application
of the Court’s constitutional standing elements.  As a conceptual
matter, one could translate the Allen claim into opportunity-injury
53. Thus, Justice O’Connor explained:
It is, first, uncertain how many racially discriminatory private schools are in fact
receiving tax exemptions.  Moreover, it is entirely speculative . . . whether withdrawal
of a tax exemption from any particular school would lead the school to change its
policies.  It is just as speculative whether any given parent of a child attending such a
private school would decide to transfer the child to public school as a result of any
changes in educational or financial policy made by the private school once it was
threatened with loss of tax-exempt status.  It is also pure speculation whether, in a
particular community, a large enough number of the numerous relevant school officials
and parents would reach decisions that collectively would have a significant impact on
the racial composition of the public schools.
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 758 (citations omitted).
54. If the Bakke Court had focused upon the ultimate goal of admission, rather than the
opportunity to compete, then it would have been possible for the Court to identify at least the
same number of causal links in that case that Justice O’Connor later identified in Allen.  I have
recently described the analysis as follows:
At a minimum, Bakke’s ultimate admission into the Davis medical school turned on:
(1) whether having struck down the Davis affirmative action program, the medical
school would substitute some other, constitutionally permissible, affirmative action
program; (2) whether the absence of an affirmative action program or the presence of
a newly devised plan would reduce the applications or admissions of minority
candidates, relative to nonminority candidates, as compared with the struck Davis
program; (3) whether the absence of an affirmative action program or the presence of
a newly devised plan would encourage applications by additional and more qualified
nonminority students who might have been deterred from applying based upon the
impact upon their admissions prospects of the struck affirmative action program; and
(4) whether the altered pool of both minority and nonminority applicants that would
result from striking the Davis plan would have had a significant enough impact on
Bakke’s relative qualifications to the others in both pools to change the outcome of his
application. One can, of course, go further: (5) whether or not having struck down the
Davis program, other medical schools would follow suit, in turn, affecting the
composition of their own applicant pools with spillover effects upon that at Davis; and
(6) whether the changed admissions regimes at other medical schools would make
those schools more attractive for Bakke to apply to and to matriculate, if offered a
seat.
STEARNS, supra note 4, at ch. 1.
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terms, thus justifying a grant of standing.  At the same time, one could
translate the Bakke claim into ultimate-relief terms, thus justifying a
denial of standing.  As William Fletcher has shown, if we set aside the
largely irrelevant case of the lying plaintiff, we cannot resolve difficult
questions of standing by asking whether or not a plaintiff is injured.55
Instead, determining which among a broad potential class of injuries
provide the basis for justiciable claims is the difficult policy question
that lurks behind the Supreme Court’s standing doctrine.  The
analysis is particularly important in the context of these two cases
because both sets of facts can be presented according to the Supreme
Court’s announced standing criteria in a manner that is consistent
with identifying either a justiciable opportunity injury or a
nonjusticiable claim to ultimate relief.  These cases are not
distinguishable in kind.  Both cases involve an identified law or
policy, which is allegedly illegal, and which if struck down would
produce more favorable market conditions for the claimants.56  But if
one focuses on the underlying function of the Court’s constitutional
standing criteria, which is to limit judicial law making to those cases in
which the obligation to make law grows out of the need to resolve
actual and concrete disputes, rather than out of the desire to affect
favorable doctrine, then much of the apparent inconsistency
dissipates.  In each case, the Court has implicitly identified those
characteristic features that correlate more or less strongly with either
the likelihood of using the case as a vehicle to make law, on the one
hand, or the desire for concrete relief, on the other.57
While this final standing category is important in illustrating the
inevitable malleability of the Court’s standing elements and in
assessing some recent innovations in redressability doctrine, it is
generally less significant than third party and diffuse harm standing in
the statutory context.  When a claimant relies for standing upon a
federal statute, he or she is generally trying to enforce the very statute
for which standing has been conferred.58  As a result, such claimants
will rarely invoke a statutory conferral of standing to challenge a
statute as unconstitutional or to challenge a regulation as violating a
federal statute.  Stated differently, when a plaintiff relies upon a
55. See generally William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988).
56. This explains why I have labeled the cases that fall into this category “no right to an
undistorted market.”
57. For a discussion of more cases in this category, and how they fit within the larger social
choice analysis of standing, see STEARNS, supra note 4, at ch. 6.
58. For an apparent exception, see Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
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federal statute for standing, she generally seeks to have enforced the
apparent desire of Congress to remove whatever distortion she agrees
does not belong in the market place.  As a result, most statutory
standing claims will fall into the third party and diffuse harms
categories.  The question then arises: To what extent can Congress
vest individuals with the power to raise claims that intuitively belong
to others or that are diffuse?  As explained in the introduction, the
Court has recently provided two seemingly opposite answers.  In the
next part, I will expand upon the model developed above to explain
the tradeoffs involved with broad or restrictive rules of statutory
standing.  In the part that follows, I will review some of the more
recent statutory standing cases in light of the model developed below.
II.  A PRELIMINARY MODEL OF ENVIRONMENTAL STANDING
In virtually every statute in which Congress confers standing
broadly, it is either affording individuals the power to litigate the
claims that under traditional analysis would be better understood as
residing with others, or to litigate claims that will redress a diffuse
harm.  Cases that fall into these two categories present fairly low cost
mechanisms for manipulating the order of precedents.  By further
developing the social choice model to account for the conditions
under which Congress might be motivated to confer broad standing
by statute, and the conditions under which the Court might be
resistant to such broad standing conferrals, we can better understand
the apparent inconsistency in the Court’s most prominent recent
statutory standing decisions, Lujan and Laidlaw.
In the prior part, I explained that modern standing doctrine is
consistent with certain intuitions, revealed by social choice, about the
relative institutional competence of the Supreme Court and Congress
to resolve disputes.  The critical difference is that in contrast with the
Supreme Court, which is presumed obligated to issue a collective
judgment in cases properly before it, Congress can remain inert when
it is faced with collective intransitive preferences.  One implication of
this analysis is that Congress’s power to remain inert systematically
favors the status quo relative to other options when majority
dissatisfaction with the status quo is split among many potential
options, none of which is persistently favored by a majority in a series
of direct comparisons with all others.59  Thus, if in the course of
59. Another way to express this intuition is that when the majority disfavoring the status
quo has single-peaked preferences, then the majority can coalesce around a single favored
alternative to the status quo.  When the majority disfavoring the status quo instead had multi-
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construing a statute the Court produces a change in the law that a
majority of Congress disfavors, that result might well remain stable, if
Congress lacks Condorcet-minority support for a particular change
from the judicially created status quo.  The risk of entrenching the
new status quo might well explain why under certain conditions, the
Court is disinclined to confer standing as broadly as federal statutes
allow.  In this analysis, the Court’s disinclination to allow Congress to
define the outermost limits of standing is a function of the mixed
signals it receives concerning intended compliance obligations.  These
mixed signals arise from differential enforcement between the private
attorneys general on the one hand, and the regulatory agency on the
other.  Simply put, the Supreme Court has hesitated in its willingness
to allow the federal judiciary to become the vehicle for resolving
certain important, and only partially resolved, questions of
environmental policy.60
When confronted with intransitive preferences, Congress not
only has the options to remain inert or to commodify preferences, but
also it has the option to delegate decision making authority to
another institution.  When Congress exercises the latter option, it
avoids (quite likely intentionally) resolving some of the most
contentious features of the underlying issue.  Most commonly,
Congress delegates lawmaking power to regulatory agencies.  But in
recent decades, Congress has also effectively delegated difficult
questions of regulatory enforcement to the federal judiciary through
the liberalization of standing.  Setting aside a brief flirtation with the
nondelegation doctrine in the New Deal, the Supreme Court has
generally allowed extremely broad agency delegations.61  And until
Lujan, the Court appeared to treat private attorneys general
peaked preferences, it might not be able to coalesce around a single alternative to the status
quo, absent commodification of preferences.
60. One could respond that Congress simply means what it says in whatever statute
combines specified compliance requirements with broad standing.  The difficulty is that this
treats Congress as a single being, rather than as a collection of independent decision makers.
Cf. Kenneth Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as an Oxymoron, 12
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).  Because Congress is an institution in which collective
preferences are aggregated, there is no reason to assume all of Congress agrees to the content of
each provision in a bill that becomes law.  A more sophisticated understanding of Congress
recognizes that some provisions within a bill are included to appease specific members whose
support is necessary to ensure passage of the larger legislation, even though the resulting
provisions would not have garnered independent majority support.  For a more detailed
discussion consistent with this analysis, see Maxwell L. Stearns, The Public Choice Case Against
the Item Veto, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385 (1992).
61. For an informative analysis of the nondelegation doctrine, see Peter H. Aranson et al.,
A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982).
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delegations in much the same manner.  Two questions then arise.
First, why has the Court recently retrenched upon the latter form of
delegation? And second, why has it vacillated in doing so?  The
model of statutory standing, which focuses upon the disparate signals
between agency enforcement and private attorney general
enforcement with respect to the preferred enforcement level of the
median member of the enacting Congress of an environmental
statute, will help to resolve these questions.62
A.  Modeling the Creation of Broad Statutory Standing
I will now provide an illustration of legislative bargaining that
will allow us to develop a model of statutory standing.  In the model, I
will present three forms of bargaining in sequence: (1) substantive
bargaining; (2) nonsubstantive bargaining; and (3) bargaining over
standing.63  By substantive bargaining, I mean bargaining over the
compliance provisions of the relevant environmental law bill.  By
nonsubstantive bargaining, I mean bargaining that involves matters
unrelated to the substance of the bill in question, which can include
adding special interest items to the same bill, negotiating special
interest items into other bills, or negotiating over the substance of
other bills.  Finally, bargaining over standing involves negotiating the
extent to which parties other than the relevant federal agency can
seek redress for statutory violations in federal court.  These three
modes of bargaining can occur in any sequence, and not every mode
of bargaining need accompany every bill.  The sequence of bargaining
presented below is intended solely for expositional purposes.
Assume that a pro-environmental congressman introduces a bill
calling for a significant and costly reduction in the emissions of
62. As Professors Barnett and Terrell correctly observe, my approach is focused upon the
manner in which the Court employs standing to calibrate decision-making between the federal
judiciary, on the one hand, and Congress, on the other, rather than upon the relationship
between standing and efficient application of environmental statutes (or the reduction of rent
seeking).  That is why the text focuses upon the anticipated level of enforcement, rather than
the efficient level of enforcement.  Either level could be viewed as optimal, depending upon
whether one chooses a majoritarian norm, or reduction of rent seeking, as the preferred
baseline.  In any event, I agree with Professors Barnett and Terrell that several of the insights
developed in their article complement the social choice analysis of standing.  See A.H. Barnett
& Timothy D. Terrell, Economic Observations on Citizen-Suit Provisions of Environmental
Legislation, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1 (2001).
63. Certain features of this model grow out of the analysis of legislative bargaining
developed in Stearns, supra note 60 (developing model that combines substantive and length
bargaining, where the latter involves the inclusion of unrelated special interest legislation that
would fall subject to the item veto).
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specified chemicals into all waterways.  In an effort to gain the
necessary support for the bill, the congressman will be called upon to
engage in some substantive compromises, for example, by extending
the compliance time frame or by softening the ultimate compliance
requirements.  Assume that the bill, as initially proposed, represents
the sponsor’s preferred resolution of the underlying policy issues, and
thus her ideal point.  The process of substantive bargaining will move
the bill from that ideal point closer toward the preferred position of
the median member of the enacting Congress.  Figure 1 depicts the
relevant issue spectrum.
Liberal Median Conservative
Strict compliance Lax compliance
(sponsor’s ideal point)                                                          (status quo)
Figure 1: Statutory Compliance Spectrum
Along this issue spectrum, it is assumed that liberals generally
favor strict compliance and conservatives generally favor lax
compliance.64  The median voter theorem predicts that to the extent
that support will be determined by substantive compromise along a
single issue dimension, the dominant position necessary to gain
majority support will be at or near the median voter.65  As the
substantive compliance provisions move toward the preferred
position of the median legislator, those members whose preferences
are closer to the sponsor’s ideal point, and who thus favor the initial
bill, will still prefer the relatively stricter timing offered in the watered
down bill and compliance requirements to the status quo.  At the
same time, the substantive compromise will gain the support of those
marginal legislators who are positioned closer to the median, and who
would not have supported the bill in the sponsor’s ideal form.66
64. The text uses “generally” because it is possible to have a predominantly liberal or a
predominantly conservative Congress, and since liberals and conservatives can sometimes
embrace specific policy positions, it adds with their general ideological views.
65. For a discussion of the median voter theorem and its relevance, see Harold Hotelling,
Stability in Competition, XXXIX ECON. J. 41-57 (1929); see also Randall G. Holcombe, An
Empirical Test of the Median Voter Model, 18 ECON. INQUIRY 260 (1980); Thomas Romer &
Howard Rosenthal, The Elusive Median Voter, 12 J. PUB. ECON. 143 (1979); Charles K. Rowley,
The Relevance of the Median Voter Theorem, 140 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON.
104 (1984).
66. As a matter of definition, the marginal voters are those members whose decisions to
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The bill sponsor could of course water the bill down completely,
such that it entirely ratifies present emissions requirements.  Doing
so, however, would turn the bill from an environmental protection bill
into a bill that protects industry from further environmental
regulation.  At some point, the votes that the sponsor would gain
among those who are interested in protecting industry against further
environmental regulation will at least partially offset the lost
membership from her initial coalition.  In addition, and perhaps more
obviously, the sponsor will not likely turn her pro-environmental bill
into the opposite simply because doing so might increase its prospects
for passage.67  All of this simply underscores that substantive
bargaining has an implicit limit.  Where this limit lies with respect to
any particular bill, environmental or otherwise, is a function of two
factors.  The first is the need to create, or at least move toward, a
successful majority coalition to pass the bill.  The second is the need
to move the law sufficiently in the favored direction relative to the
status quo with respect to the regulatory issue in question to retain
the initial impetus in support of the bill.  The more critical point is
that wherever this limit lies, it might not allow for the requisite
support for passage.  Simply put, if the only mechanism for gaining
support were to water down the bill, the sponsor might have to move
unacceptably far from her ideal point to secure passage.
The bill’s sponsor has other methods of securing support.  For
example, the sponsor can also negotiate matters unrelated to the bill’s
substance.  She can promise support for separate legislation, whether
general or special interest, in exchange for the support of the sponsor
of that legislation for her proposed bill.  Alternatively, the sponsor
can agree to include nonsubstantive additions to her bill, in the form
of special interest items, that will add to the cost of the bill, but that
will not modify its substantive content.68  Through either of these
support or oppose the bill is a function of the substantive content regarding the timing and
extent of required compliance.  Those members who are inframarginal and supportive will
continue to support the bill even after it is watered down.  Those members who are
inframarginal and opposed will continue to oppose even after the bill is watered down.
Substantive bargaining only has the potential to affect those members who are not
inframarginal.
67. If a legislator were only concerned with being a constant member of winning coalitions,
without regard to the substance of the approved bills, she could simply vote in favor of all
legislation that she expects to see passed.
68. Admittedly, the boundaries between and among all three categories of bargaining are
not air tight.  Thus, for example, an exception to a general compliance requirement that is
sufficiently narrow in scope as to benefit a specific industry might be regarded as a form of
special interest legislation or might be regarded as a further substantive modification from the
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alternative forms of bargaining, the bill sponsor can trade her support
for unrelated legislation, either public or special interest, or for
attaching unrelated special interest items to her bill, as the price for
gaining additional support.  Because this mode of bargaining takes
place along a nonsubstantive dimension, the resulting coalition in
support of the bill might not line up neatly based upon political
ideology.  For those legislators seeking the benefits of securing special
interest legislation, the environmental bill might present a better
vehicle for success than available alternatives.69  Certainly those who
are more inclined toward the substantive merit of the bill will have a
stronger preference for this particular bargain than those who are not.
While the bargain involves something separate from the content of
this bill, we can still intuit internal limits to this form of negotiation.
To the extent that it adds special interest items to the bill, it increases
the cost of passing that legislation.  The cost alone might make the bill
less attractive to the sponsor.  In addition, the added cost will increase
the risk of a presidential veto.  As a result of these combined
concerns, the bill’s sponsor might also be unwilling to negotiate along
this dimension sufficiently to secure passage.
There is at least one additional mechanism for gaining support.
Assuming the substantive requirements for compliance are
determined, and that all nonsubstantive bargaining is agreed to,70 the
bill sponsor can negotiate over who has the power to enforce the
statute’s substantive provisions.71  In selecting the appropriate
sponsor’s ideal point.  And as Professors Barnett and Terrell explain, rival business groups can
benefit from specific regulatory restrictions that take the form of barriers to entry.  See Barnett
& Terrell, supra note 62, at 11.  Broadening standing can operate as one means of raising a
rival’s cost, and thus of limiting competition, especially if existing businesses are exempt from
new regulations based upon grandfather clauses.  While broadening standing can thus be viewed
as a form of special interest legislation, for purposes of developing the model in the text, I
assume the more common situation in which the regulated industry can be expected to oppose
broadened standing.  The important point, in any event, is not to put a particular compromise
into the correct analytical box.  It is instead to understand the relationship between and among
the various modes of legislative bargaining and their implications for the Court’s evolving
statutory standing doctrine.
69. For an analysis of how those empowered to prevent the passage of legislation through
the various “negative legislative checkpoints” use their power to procure desired special interest
legislation, see Stearns, supra note 60.
70. Again, the chronological assumptions set out in the text are simply for expositional
purposes.  We can instead assume a given level of substantive and nonsubstantive bargaining,
whether now or in the future.
71. As seen in Lujan, the substantive provisions can include procedural requirements, for
example, the failure to engage in statutorily required inter-agency consultation before funding a
project that threatens an endangered species or its habitat.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555 (1992).  By substantive, I mean to distinguish other provisions that are the product
II - FROM LUJAN TO LAIDLAW - A PRELIMINARY MODEL - STEARNS.DOC 05/09/01  1:54 PM
Spring 2001] FROM LUJAN TO LAIDLAW 349
enforcement arrangement, the bill sponsor can choose from various
points along a spectrum.  At one extreme, the bill sponsor can limit
enforcement to the relevant executive agency, which in most
instances will be the Environmental Protection Agency, the
Department of the Interior, or various state environmental agencies.
At the opposite extreme, she can confer standing broadly upon “all
persons.”  In between, she can elect from various private attorneys
general provisions that are more or less restrictive in scope.  This can
include limiting standing to citizens, affected persons, injured persons,
or even persons who live within a specified distance of the regulated
facility or end point of the emissions flow.72  A simplified spectrum of







Broad standing                                                             Narrow standing
Figure 2: Statutory Standing Options
Like nonsubstantive bargaining, this form of negotiation does
not involve a direct change in the bill’s compliance requirements.  But
compromises over standing might well have the same effect on the
ultimate regulated conduct as compromises over substantive
compliance.  Indeed, by conferring standing more or less broadly, the
sponsor can substantially affect the anticipated optimal compliance
level among those who are subject to the regulation.  And the sponsor
of nonsubstantive special interest bargaining.
72. Justice Scalia provided a sampling of the range of options in comparing the open-ended
standing provision in the Endangered Species Act (ESA) with the standing provisions in some
more restrictive statutes, as follows:
The first operative portion of the [ESA standing] provision says that “any person may
commence a civil suit”—an authorization of remarkable breadth when compared with
the language Congress ordinarily uses.  Even in some other environmental statutes,
Congress has used more restrictive formulations, such as “[any person] having an
interest which is or may be adversely affected,” 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1994) (Clean
Water Act); see also 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a) (1994) (Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act); “any person suffering legal wrong,” 15 U.S.C. § 797(b)(5) (1994)
(Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act); or “any person having a valid
legal interest which is or may be adversely affected . . . whenever such action
constitutes a case or controversy,” 42 U.S.C. § 9124(a) (1994) (Ocean Thermal Energy
Conversion Act). And in contexts other than the environment, Congress has often
been even more restrictive.  In statutes concerning unfair trade practices and other
commercial matters, for example, it has authorized suit only by “any person injured in
his business or property,” 7 U.S.C. § 2305(c) (1994); see also 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1994), or
only by “competitors, customers, or subsequent purchasers,” § 298(b).
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164-65 (1997).
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can do so in a relatively more obfuscatory manner than is the case
with substantive bargaining.
While seemingly technical, there is little question that the
selected level of standing will affect the substantive construction of
and the incentives for compliance under the statute.  Indeed, the
statute is of little value but for its potential to be enforced.  And to a
considerable extent, the enforcement level will be a function of who
has standing to bring suit to redress a violation.  There is, however, a
critical difference between the questions of compliance level and
standing.  While negotiations over compliance level are likely as a
general matter to fall along predictable ideological lines, negotiations
over standing have the potential to thwart conventional ideological
expectations.  Certainly we can expect a positive correlation between
those who support strict enforcement and those who seek to liberalize
standing.  But there might well be conditions under which those who
are generally more conservative, and even those who are subject to
the bill’s substantive regulations, might favor broad standing.
Some conservatives might assume, as Bennett v. Spear73
ultimately demonstrated, that broad standing might inure to the
benefit of those seeking to limit, rather than to further, the ultimate
objectives of environmental statutes, at least if the claimants can
demonstrate that regulatory enforcement is overly zealous or fails
properly to weigh the economic impact, as required by statute, of the
chosen method of enforcement.74  Others might consider the standing
issue as part of a tradeoff for negotiations over the substantive
compliance requirements, such that the broader the standing
provisions, the more lax the imposed emissions restrictions.  This
tradeoff might well be worth the risk, especially in a period in which
the Court’s standing jurisprudence is in flux.75  In addition, some
73. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
74. In Bennett, the Court afforded standing to two irrigation districts and to the operators
of two ranches within those districts, who claimed that the failure to consider the economic
impact upon them of restricting access to a reservoir pursuant to the Endangered Species Act
(ESA) violated the ESA.  For a more detailed discussion, see infra Part III.
75. The federal environmental statutes began to incorporate broad standing provisions
based upon the Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970, Mich. Comp. Laws §§
691.1201-691.1207.  See Coplan, supra note 11, at 215-16.  It might not be a coincidence that the
expansion of environmental standing began after 1970.  As I have demonstrated in prior work, it
was during the early 1970’s that the Supreme Court became increasingly prone to rulings that
revealed the possibility of multidimensionality, and that therefore risked codifying intransitive
preferences.  It was also in this period, therefore, that ideological interest groups gained a
particular interest in manipulating the order of case decisions in the federal judiciary, with an
eye toward the Supreme Court.  Finally, it was in this period that the Court began to respond to
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conservatives might view citizen standing the way they view
delegation generally.  In an era when the Court is restricting standing
generally, broadening statutory standing might allow them to claim
credit if the Court expands its restrictive standing jurisprudence into
the statutory area, as in Lujan, while they can pass blame, if the Court
does the opposite, as in Laidlaw.76  For example, some might favor
citizen standing simply because the results of such litigation would
appear to be further from their oversight control.  While industries
can call upon members of Congress to engage in regulatory oversight
when enforcement is too strict, this is less likely when a federal
agency is not responsible in the first instance for the chosen level of
enforcement.  Finally, as Professors Barnett and Terrell observe,
some regulated businesses might prefer broad standing as part of an
enforcement scheme to raise barriers to entry.77
Liberals will also have a broad set of reasons for supporting
liberalized statutory standing. Some liberals might seek broad
standing because they correctly anticipate that those who are likely to
bring private attorney general suits will tend to have a stronger pro-
environmental bias and will likely seek more zealous enforcement
than will the EPA.  Others might prefer liberal standing because it
will deflect pressure from the enforcement agency, thus strengthening
the support for the now more moderate federal or state regulatory
enforcement.  And some liberals might prefer broad standing to
hedge against changes in future administrations, which could have the
effect of retrenching upon expected governmental enforcement.
Finally, among both liberals and conservatives, there will be members
who must respond to both industry and pro-environmental
constituents.  For those members, broad standing allows support for a
more modest specified level of substantive compliance, but creates a
vehicle for more zealous private enforcement actions.  Members can
thus claim credit for slight beneficial alterations to substantive
compliance levels in the original statute, and blame the courts for
enforcement that is more ambitious than their industry constituents
these external pressures by imposing stricter barriers to constitutional standing.  See generally
STEARNS, supra note 4.
76. For liberals, delegation produces the opposite tradeoff.  Liberals will claim credit if the
Court allows expansive statutory standing, as in Laidlaw, and will pass blame if it instead
imports its stringent constitutional standing restrictions into the statutory context, as in Lujan.
But the key point is that both liberals and conservatives might prefer judicial resolution of
standing to legislative resolution of the substantive question of compliance, for which they
cannot simultaneously take credit and pass blame.
77. See Barnett & Terrell, supra note 62, at 18-19.
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would prefer.
The critical point is that unlike choosing the compliance level,
which can generally be expected to divide legislators along traditional
ideological lines, choosing the level of standing has the potential to
produce common interests among some who are generally pro-
environmental and some who are generally pro-industry.  In this
respect, conferring broad standing in environmental statutes is quite
like delegating to agencies.  But there is a critical difference as well. A
delegation to private enforcers removes at least some enforcement
power from the agencies.  In many statutes, this is not a complete
removal.  Once a suit is filed, the claimant must notify the relevant
agencies, state and federal, which then have the power to intervene or
even take over the suit.78  Even though the possibility of private
standing at least removes some power to control the selection and
timing of cases,  it is quite plausible to intuit conditions under which a
liberal EPA would favor liberalized standing.  Under such a regime,
the EPA can to some extent deflect blame for the most ambitious
enforcement actions, thus allowing such suits to proceed, while
appearing more moderate in its own enforcement.  It is not surprising,
for example, that the EPA favored citizen standing in Laidlaw.79
B.  Modeling the Judicial Response
The preceding discussion analyzed the supply side of statutory
standing.  We must now consider how the Court, behaving as a group
of rational actors, might respond when confronted with a citizen suit
that relies upon a broad based standing provision within an
environmental statute.  To keep the exposition simple, we can
imagine a case that presents the common features of the two most
significant recent statutory standing cases, Lujan and Laidlaw.
Assume that the defendant, whether a governmental agency or a
private company, has engaged in a series of technical statutory
violations.  Further assume these technical violations have not
produced, and are not likely to produce in the future, any discernible
injury to the claimants other than the psychic harm associated with
being committed to a safer environment and knowing that technical
violations of federal environmental laws are taking place.
78. As the Laidlaw Court explained, “[t]he [Clean Water] Act . . . bars a citizen from suing
if the EPA or the State [if after having received the required 60 days notice, either] has already
commenced, and is ‘diligently prosecuting,’ an enforcement action.”  528 U.S. at 175.
79. See id. at 188 n.4 (stating that “the [Clean Water Act] allows the Administrator of the
EPA to ‘intervene as a matter of right . . .’ when the EPA opposes a particular citizen suit”).
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By assumption, these are cases that federal enforcers have
elected not to prosecute after receiving appropriate notice.  If the
private attorney general had not sued, the technical violations would
have proceeded unabated.  The Supreme Court justices understand
that in addition to the substantive compliance provisions,
enforcement affects overall deterrence under the statute.  Some
justices might seek to limit the reach of the statute, including its
standing provisions, while others might seek to further the reach of
the statute, in part by allowing liberalized standing.  Setting aside
these two opposed groups, at least a subgroup within the Court might
try to gauge the appropriate response based upon their best proxy for
legislative expectations, which we can cast as those of the median
member of the enacting Congress.80  If ambitious interest group-
driven litigation prompts a level of enforcement that varies
considerably from that of the median legislator, then the effect of
allowing liberalized standing would be to skew enforcement toward
the sponsor’s ideal point, even though the result would not have
garnered majority support of the enacting Congress.81
Based upon this analysis, we can now consider why the Court,
confronted with a broad statutory standing provision, might seek to
impose limits drawn from its constitutional standing requirements,
specifically injury in fact, causation, and redressability.  In a statute
that contemplates only agency enforcement, the agency has
considerable enforcement discretion.  The regulated industry will
attempt to gauge its conduct according to the compliance
requirements under the statute times the probability of agency
enforcement.  Rarely, if ever, will optimal statutory enforcement be
one hundred percent.82  The appropriate analogy is one of triage.
80. If we assume that the relevant issue spectrum involves a single dimension, then the
expectations of the median member of the enacting Congress will be equivalent to
Congressional intent.  Without the support of the median member, the bill would not have
passed.  If, on the other hand, the relevant issue spectrum involves more than a single
dimension, then there is no median member, thus making it more difficult to gauge
Congressional intent.  Instead, courts must employ imperfect proxies based, in part, upon the
relationships between and among the relevant issue dimensions.
81. Of course, as Bennett demonstrates, it is also possible for a broad standing provision to
allow for industry-generated litigation that signals an enforcement level closer to a regulatory
opponent’s ideal point, which also would not have garnered majority support of the enacting
Congress.
82. See Barnett & Terrell, supra note 62, at 10.  There, the authors explain:
Governments will prosecute egregious violations, but pursuing the less significant
offenses does not create enough environmental benefit to justify the use of limited
funds and runs the risk of upsetting voters.  However, private enforcers of
environmental law are unresponsive to political pressures, and have no reason to avoid
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Given its resource limitations and political pressures, the enforcement
agency is likely, as a general matter, to pursue the most egregious
violations first, often failing to attend to minor or technical violations.
Like the enforcement agency, organizations that seek to monitor
and redress violations in the capacity of private attorneys general also
have limited resources, which are offset by the reimbursement
provisions under the statutes themselves.83  Those organizations that
are inclined to bring such suits will most likely be motivated by a
combination of two objectives: (1) the desire to increase the level of
environmental enforcement under the relevant statute; and (2) the
desire for reimbursement of expenses and fees.84  The statutes are
generally structured to limit reimbursements such that if the agency
has already pursued the action, then the organization will not
recover.85  We may assume that those who are willing to invest the
considerable resources to gather the information necessary to identify
a prima facie statutory violation, retain an attorney, and then bring
the suit, are those who are most ideologically committed to strict
enforcement.  If so, then we can anticipate that a regime allowing
both agency and private enforcement risks sending mixed, and
perhaps inconsistent, signals to the federal judiciary concerning the
preferred level of enforcement of the median member of the enacting
Congress.  Although there will certainly be exceptions, based upon
fairly simple intuitions drawn from public choice, it seems probable
that the EPA will prosecute claims that are closer to those favored by
the median member of the enacting Congress than will the private
litigant. That is because the federal agency, which has a general
mandate to enforce the federal environmental statutes, is subject to
the optimal level of enforcement.
Id.  One difference between this analysis and the analysis of this text is that Professors Barnett
and Terrell anticipate an optimal level of enforcement based upon efficiency concerns, or cost-
benefit analysis.  In the text, I instead posit that from the perspective of at least a subgroup of
Supreme Court Justices, which likely occupies a median position, the optimal level of
enforcement, whether or not the most efficient, is that which the median member of the
enacting Congress would have condoned had Congress resolved that issue or that which the
agency would have sought had it elected to pursue the case.
83. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d)
(1994).
84. In addition, the private litigant is motivated by the desire not to be foreclosed by the
government agency action and by the cost and difficulty in acquiring data to support her
statutory cause of action.
85. As the Laidlaw Court explained with respect to the Clean Water Act: “the court may
award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any
prevailing or substantially prevailing party, whenever the court determines such award is
appropriate.”  528 U.S. at 175 (internal quotations omitted).
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significant political pressures and resource constraints.  As a result,
the agency is motivated to pursue the most severe violations first, and
to leave the minor violations for later, if at all.
When confronted with this divergence, the question for at least
some justices, those who lie in the median position on the Court, is
likely to be which of the competing signals should receive the Court’s
imprimatur.  While the justices on the wings of the Court might be
motivated in part by their views of the merits of the underlying claim,
for the median justice, the analysis is more likely to focus upon some
proxy for the anticipated level of enforcement of the median member
of the enacting Congress.  As the Lujan Court made plain, in devising
a judicial response to these disparate signals, the choice among
standing rules is not binary, although they can be cast along a single
normative spectrum.  Just as Congress has a broad range of choices in
conferring standing, the Court has a range of standards to impose
upon Congress as a precondition to allowing statutory standing.  In
Lujan, the Court identified three points along this spectrum.86 While
there might be additional points along the spectrum, considering
these three is sufficient for purposes of developing the model.
Justice Scalia, writing for a majority, suggested that statutory
standing is permissible only when the claimants present an injury that
is closely analogous to one recognized at common law.  Because such
injuries result in harm to the affected individual, caused by someone
else, and which a federal court can redress, this requirement, like the
constitutional standing elements generally, tends to discourage
ideologically motivated litigation. Not surprisingly, this position
would appear to correspond with a conservative policy preference
against the merits of the underlying claim in the kind of
environmental litigation described above.  And yet, this rule might
well disallow the preferred level of enforcement of the median
member of the enacting Congress.87  Because the Court’s rulings have
the potential to remain in force even if they are not consistent with
what Congress intended, at least some members of the Court might
fear that this strict requirement would have the potential to entrench
too limited a level of statutory standing.
86. For a more detailed exposition of each of these positions, see infra at Part III.B
(discussing Lujan).
87. This is consistent with the early holdings on standing under the Fair Housing Act, and
the famous dictum from Linda R.S. v. Richard D., that “Congress may enact statutes creating
legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without
the statute.” 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973).
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Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Souter, expressed this concern
in his separate concurring opinion, in which he suggested that while
Congress does not have entirely free reign to define injuries for
standing purposes, it must at the very least define the relevant injury
and relate that injury to an identified class of potential claimants.88
While this would allow broader standing than would Scalia, it does
not afford Congress complete discretion.  Moreover, this position
abstracts from any inquiry into the merits of the underlying claim.
While the rule might provide a means of simultaneously broadening
statutory standing and limiting the divergent signals from that
preferred by the median member of the enacting Congress, at this
point it remains to be seen whether the Kennedy position will emerge
as dominant.89
Finally, Justice Blackmun, who dissented in Lujan, suggested
that the Court can allow Congress to confer standing broadly, even if
in doing so it allows suit by a claimant who has suffered no discernible
injury beyond knowing that a federal environmental law has been
violated.  As with the Scalia position, which correlates with a
conservative policy preference on the underlying issue of law, this
position correlates with a liberal policy preference favoring the merits
of the same underlying issue.  Justice Ginsburg essentially embraced
this position in her majority Laidlaw opinion.90 While this would allow
Congress to choose broad standing, it again risks endorsing a more
ambitious level of enforcement than that which the median member
of the enacting Congress might have selected if forced to determine
the preferred level of compliance in the absence of liberalized
standing. The spectrum is depicted in Figure 3 below:
88. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
89. Because the various positions on standing described in the text can be cast along a
single normative spectrum, under the narrowest grounds rule, the Kennedy position, which lies
at the median point along that spectrum, has the potential to become law even if a majority fails
to embrace it.  See STEARNS, supra note 4, at 104-28 (providing social choice analysis of
narrowest grounds rule).  Laidlaw appears to suggest, however, a majority swing from the
conservative position in Lujan to a new liberal position.
90. See infra Part III.E (discussing Laidlaw).
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Figure 3: Judicially Imposed Limits on Statutory Standing
While earlier statutory standing cases suggested that the
Supreme Court would condone broad statutory standing, the Lujan
majority instead embraced the extreme opposite position.  Most
recently, the Laidlaw Court appears to have endorsed, once again,
the broad standing position.  In the next and final part, which reviews
these and other environmental standing cases in greater detail, I will
apply this model of statutory standing to identify those factors that
might have caused the Court to slide back and forth along this
justiciability spectrum.
III.  AN OVERVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL STANDING
In this part, I will provide a brief overview of some of the
Supreme Court’s most significant recent statutory standing cases as
they relate to the model of statutory standing developed in the prior
part.  While I will focus in particular upon Lujan and Laidlaw, given
their unique doctrinal significance to modern environmental standing,
I will also discuss three other cases, Raines v. Byrd, Bennett v. Spear,
and Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment.  Raines v.
Byrd, which did not involve environmental standing, is nonetheless
significant to the model developed in Part II.  Raines highlights the
Court’s implicit concern in identifying a meaningful proxy for the
views of the median member of the enacting Congress when
enforcing federal statutes.  Bennett provides an intriguing example of
how superimposing the constitutional standing elements onto a
statutory context can lead the Court to prefer the views of those who
oppose enforcement to those of the median member of the enacting
Congress.  And Steel Company reveals some of the recent limits that
the Court has imposed under the guise of redressability, which
provide a means beyond injury in fact of linking the statutory
justiciability criteria to the preferences of that median member.  The
discussion in this part will be limited both in its selection of cases, and
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in the presentation of those cases that are discussed.91  The purpose of
the analysis, however, is not to provide a comprehensive presentation
of statutory standing case law, but rather is to provide a preliminary
assessment based upon prominent recent standing decisions of the
social choice model developed in this article.
With the exception of Raines, which I will discuss first, I will
employ chronology as an organizing principal.  I will begin with
Raines, a case which denied standing to five then-present members
and one former member of Congress, who challenged the
constitutionality of the Line-Item Veto Act.  By focusing on whether
losing members of Congress can sue to challenge the constitutionality
of a statute, Raines highlights the implicit concern of centrist jurists,
those most likely to eschew resolutions that might be regarded as
ideologically motivated, about gauging standing rules in statutory
cases according to how those rules further the preferences of the
median member of the enacting Congress.
A.  Raines v. Byrd92
In Raines v. Byrd,93 the Supreme Court issued a seven-to-two
decision denying standing to five present members and one former
member of Congress, who challenged the constitutionality of the
Line-Item Veto Act (the “Act”).94  In doing so, the Supreme Court
reversed a long-standing practice of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which had afforded
standing to members of Congress who challenged statutes that they
alleged compromised their constitutionally established lawmaking
powers.95  At the same time, the Raines Court infused uncertainty into
the underlying ground rules of legislative bargaining in Congress,96 for
91. For some cases, I have previously provided more detailed expositions.  For a more
detailed discussion and analysis of Lujan, Bennett, and Raines, see STEARNS, supra note 4, at ch.
6; see also Stearns, Standing and Social Choice, supra note 2.  Portions of the discussions of
these three cases presented below are taken from these works.
92. Portions of this discussion and analysis are based upon the presentation in STEARNS,
supra note 4, at ch. 6.
93. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
94. Pub. L. No. 104-30, 110 Stat. 1200 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 691-692 (Supp. V 1999)).
95. See, e.g., Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21
(D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 475 U.S. 1044 (1986), vacated by 479
U.S. 361 (1987); Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).  See also Raines, 521 U.S. at 813, 821
n.4.  The United States Supreme Court had never endorsed this practice.  See id. at 815.
96. For a public choice analysis of how the item veto might alter congressional bargaining,
see Stearns, supra note 60.  The article was written prior to the adoption of the Line-Item Veto
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a period that lasted until the Court finally reached the merits of the
issue presented in Raines, in Clinton v. City of New York.97  In City of
New York, the Court struck down the Act as violating the
requirements of Article I, § 7.
While the Act nowhere used the term “veto,” it provided the
President with the authority to “cancel” certain spending and tax
benefits after he signed them into law.98  Under the Act, a cancellation
became effective when the House and Senate received the President’s
“special message” providing notice of the cancellation. The Act
further established that within thirty days of receipt of the special
message, Congress could disapprove a cancellation through ordinary
legislation, meaning a simple majority vote in both houses.99
Consistent with the requirements of Article I, § 7, the Act specified
that if the President then vetoed the disapproval bill, Congress would
need to override with a two-thirds majority of both houses.100
The Act included two provisions to expedite judicial review of
the Act.  First, the Act afforded members of Congress with standing.
Thus, the Act states that “[a]ny member of Congress or any
individual adversely affected by [this Act] may bring an action, in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, for
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on the ground that any
provision of this part violates the Constitution.”101
Act and was directed at proposed constitutional amendments conferring item veto power upon
the President.
97. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
98. The Act provided in relevant part:
The President may, with respect to any bill or joint resolution that has been signed into
law pursuant to Article I, section 7, of the Constitution of the United States, cancel in
whole—(1) any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority; (2) any item of new
direct spending; or (3) any limited tax benefit, if the President—(A) determines that
such cancellation will—(i) reduce the Federal budget deficit; (ii) not impair any
essential Government functions; and (iii) not harm the national interest; and (B)
notifies the Congress of such cancellation by transmitting a special message . . . within
five calendar days (excluding Sundays) after the enactment of the law [to which the
cancellation applies].
Raines, 521 U.S. at 814-15 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 691(a)) (alterations in original) (indentations
omitted).  In the case of direct spending allocations, cancel means to rescind, and in the case of
limited tax benefits, cancel means to prevent the benefit from having legal effect.  See 2 U.S.C. §
691e(4)(A), (B), and (C) (Supp. V 1999); see also Raines, 521 U.S. at 815.  The Act further
defined limited tax benefit to include revenue-losing provisions benefiting 100 or fewer persons
under Title 26 in any fiscal year, or a tax provision providing temporary or permanent
transitional relief for 10 or fewer persons.  See 2 U.S.C. § 691e(9)(A)(i) and (ii) (Supp. V 1999).
99. See 2 U.S.C. § 691d(b) (Supp. V 1999).
100. See 521 U.S. at 825 n.9.
101. 2 U.S.C. § 692 (a)(1) (Supp. V 1999).
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Second, it provided for expedited judicial review in the District
Court for the District of Columbia and for direct appeal and
expedited review of any order concerning the Act by the district court
to the United States Supreme Court.102
The Raines plaintiffs alleged that the Act injured them in their
capacity as members of Congress by altering their constitutional role
in the drafting and repeal of legislation.103  The Government moved to
dismiss on the grounds of ripeness and standing.  On direct appeal
from a district court judgment, which rejected the motion to dismiss
and then struck down the Act as unconstitutional, the Supreme Court
reversed.  Writing for a majority of six, with Justice Souter concurring
separately, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that plaintiffs lacked
standing.104  The Court issued four separate opinions.  For our
purposes, the most significant are those authored by Chief Justice
Rehnquist for a majority, and by Justice Stevens in dissent.  Together,
these two opinions squarely present the difficulty in defining injury in
the context of a statute that confers standing broadly, other than by
identifying proxies for the expectations of the median member of the
enacting Congress.
Chief Justice Rehnquist defined the claimed injury as the failure
to have one’s vote properly counted in the legislative process with
respect to future legislation subject to the line-item veto.  For the
sitting members of Congress seeking standing, this had yet to occur.
The difficulty according to Rehnquist was twofold. First, as members
of Congress, plaintiffs did not allege a personal injury.  Instead, they
alleged an injury in their official capacities.  Second, even assuming
that they were personally injured or that injury in their official
capacity sufficed for standing purposes, Rehnquist reasoned that
members of Congress suffered no concrete harm in their ability to
perform their legislative function.105  Rehnquist explained that each of
102. 2 U.S.C. § 692 (b) & (c) (Supp. V 1999).
103. Plaintiffs alleged that the Act injured them in their official capacities in each of the
following ways:
The Act . . . (a) alters the legal and practical effect of all votes they may cast on bills
containing such separately vetoable items, (b) divests the [appellees] of their
constitutional role in the repeal of legislation, and (c) alters the constitutional balance
of powers between the Legislative and Executive Branches, both with respect to
measures containing separately vetoable items and with respect to other matters
coming before Congress.
Raines, 521 U.S. at 816.
104. See id. at 813.
105. Rehnquist distinguished the famous 1939 standing decision, Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S.
433 (1939), in which the Court had afforded standing to twenty state senators who voted against
the child labor amendment to the United States Constitution, but whose votes were effectively
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the plaintiffs had initially opposed the proposed Line Item Veto Act,
but simply lost.  As a result, Rehnquist found no justiciable injury to
support standing.
In contrast, Justice Stevens maintained in dissent that the
members’ claimed injury was their then-present inability to anticipate
the consequences of negotiating legislation, and of voting for or
against proposed legislation.106  This difficulty was a direct
consequence of the President’s power under the Act to effectively
alter legislative bargains once bills were signed into law.  In this
analysis, the members suffered an ongoing injury respecting the
consequences of present legislative bargaining.107
What makes Raines particularly interesting is that from the
perspective of constitutional standing, it appears to make little sense.
If the Court is using its standing doctrine as a means of preventing
path manipulation, it would appear to elevate form over substance to
demand that an actual victim of a line-item veto present the
constitutional challenge to the Act, as ultimately occurred in City of
New York.  After all, the question of whether the Line-Item Veto Act
is constitutional was neither terribly difficult, nor likely to be affected
in any significant manner by whatever decisions the Court would
issue between the time of Raines and the next case to present a
constitutional challenge without a standing defect.  But as a
consequence of denying standing, the Raines Court, as Stevens made
plain in dissent, continued to infuse a considerable degree of
uncertainty into the background rules of legislative bargaining.  The
uncertainty resulted from the absence of a clear rule.  If the Act were
upheld, members of Congress could secure agreements from the
President’s designated Congressional agents that particular items
would not be subject to the Act, or they could exempt particular
statutes expressly from the Act, as preconditions to exchanging
votes.108  If, instead, as ultimately occurred, the Act were struck down,
then members could continue to negotiate as they had before, with
the clear understanding that the President could accept or veto entire
bills, but that beyond that, he could not alter legislative bargains.  It is
nullified by an alleged illegal tie breaker.  See Raines, 521 U.S. at 821-24.
106. See id. at 838 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he appellees convincingly explain how the
immediate, constant threat of the partial veto power has a palpable effect on their current
legislative choices.”).
107. Stevens read Coleman broadly to support the proposition that legislators whose votes
had been denied full effectiveness have standing to challenge the diminution of their legislative
power.  See id. at 837-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108. This thesis is developed more fully in Stearns, supra note 60.
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only with a regime of uncertainty—which lasted from the passage of
the Line-Item Veto Act to City of New York—that members were
unable to anticipate the future consequences of their present conduct.
And yet, by denying standing, the Raines Court continued this regime
of uncertainty respecting Congressional bargaining.  The question is
“to what end?”  I would suggest that, whether or not Raines was
rightly decided,109 the model of statutory standing developed above
helps to explain the tradeoffs that the majority perceived in its
standing analysis.
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s analysis focused on the fact that those
who challenged the Act had also voted against it and lost.  The
inclusion of a provision for expedited judicial review, which allowed
for congressional standing, was apparently necessary to gain the
support of at least some members of the winning coalition that
enacted the Act.  But, as the Chief Justice observed, it is equally
obvious that those members who challenged the statute on
constitutional grounds were not part of the ultimately successful
coalition.  Allowing those who voted against the statute to control the
timing of the decision to determine its constitutionality would appear
to vindicate the preferences of those who were inframarginal and
opposed above those who were marginal and supportive.  It is, of
course, possible that the marginal and supportive member preferred
expedited resolution of the Act’s constitutionality, and insisted upon
the inclusion of the congressional standing provision as a
precondition to supporting the Act.  Nonetheless, in attempting to
assess the likely preferences of the median member of the enacting
Congress, the Court is only able to work with imperfect proxies.  It is
not surprising, therefore, that the Raines majority relied upon the fact
that those who brought suit had voted against the bill to intuit that
the timing of the requested decision might have thwarted the
expectations of that median member.  And because this would hold
true generally in cases in which Congress afforded its own members
standing, it might not be surprising that the Court used Raines to end
the longstanding contrary practice of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
In contrast with Raines, in most statutory standing cases, the
Court does not have such a clear indication that those seeking to
advance a given claim at a particular time are advancing an agenda at
odds with the median member of the enacting Congress.  As a result,
109. My own opinion, as expressed in prior writings, is that Raines was wrongly decided.  See
STEARNS, supra note 4, at ch. 6.
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just as the Court employs proxies in the constitutional standing
context to determine if the case presents a necessary, rather than
opportunistic, vehicle for the creation of substantive law, so too it
uses proxies to determine if those seeking to advance claims under a
variety of federal statutes, even those that include broad standing
provisions, are doing so in a manner that furthers or undermines the
expectations of the median member of the enacting Congress.  Until
Laidlaw, the most prominent recent decision that focused on the
identification of such proxies was Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.110
B.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife111
In Lujan, the Supreme Court denied standing to
environmentalist plaintiffs under the citizen-suit provision of the
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”).  Under the ESA, which divides
the responsibilities for protecting endangered species between the
Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce, federal
agencies whose activities might endanger such species are required to
consult with the Secretary of the Interior.112  Reversing a prior joint
regulation requiring interagency consultation for all agency activities
that might jeopardize endangered species in the United States, on the
high seas, and in foreign nations, the Secretary of the Interior and the
Secretary of Commerce issued a revised joint rule reinterpreting the
ESA.113  In the revised rule, the two departments limited the
geographic scope of the statute for purposes of interagency
consultation to those activities within the borders of the United States
or on the high seas.  The plaintiffs, environmental organizations and
two citizens interested in preserving the habitats of particular
endangered species abroad, sued the Secretary of the Interior.  They
claimed that federal agencies were funding projects that jeopardized
the habitats of particular endangered species abroad without having
engaged in the statutorily required interagency consultation.  The
plaintiffs claimed that the revised joint rule, which did not require
interagency consultation, given that the threatened habitats were
within foreign nations, violated the ESA’s substantive provisions
requiring such consultation.114
110. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
111. Portions of this discussion and analysis are based upon the presentations in STEARNS,
supra note 4, at ch. 6; Stearns, Standing and Social Choice, supra note 2, at 449-59.
112. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558.
113. See id. at 558-59.
114. See id. at 559.
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As a basis for standing, plaintiffs relied upon the following
citizen-suit provision contained in the ESA: “[A]ny person may
commence a civil suit on his own behalf (A) to enjoin any person,
including the United States and any other governmental
instrumentality or agency . . . who is alleged to be in violation of any
provision of this chapter.”115  In denying the plaintiffs standing, Justice
Scalia, writing in part for a majority and in part for a plurality of four,
determined that plaintiffs had failed to satisfy both the injury and
redressability prongs of the Court’s standing formulation.116  The
majority rejected each of three injury theories: first, an actual injury
grounded in the plaintiffs’ interest in the species whose habitats were
endangered by projects that received partial funding from federal
agencies; second, a procedural injury resulting from the failure of the
relevant agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior as
required by statute; and third, and most importantly, three nexus
theories under which individuals with an interest in endangered
species or who use any part of a contiguous ecosystem, are afforded
standing when the habitats of those species, or any part of their
ecosystems are endangered.117
One petitioner averred by affidavit that she had traveled to
Egypt in 1986, where she “observed the traditional habitat of the
endangered [N]ile crocodile,” and that, although she did not see the
crocodile directly, she hoped to do so when she next traveled to
Egypt.118 She admitted, however, that she had no specific plans to
return. Another petitioner averred that she had traveled to Sri Lanka,
where she observed the habitat of the Asian elephant and the
leopard, which, she alleged, was threatened by a project funded by
the federal Agency for International Development (“AID”).119 In a
subsequent deposition, the same petitioner admitted that, although
she hoped to return to Sri Lanka, she had no specific plans because
that country was engaged in a civil war. Both petitioners alleged that
the failure of the agencies funding the programs abroad to consult
with the Secretary of the Interior, as required by statute, had injured
them.
Writing for a majority, Justice Scalia stated that, even assuming,
which he found questionable, that “these affidavits contained facts
115. Id. at 571-72 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A)).
116. See id. at 562.
117. See id. at 565-67.
118. See id. at 563.
119. See id. at 566.
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showing that certain agency-funded projects threaten listed species,”
the petitioners lacked the requisite injury to justify granting them
standing under the statute.120 Justice Scalia held for the Court that
“‘some day’ intentions—without any description of concrete plans, or
indeed even any specification of when the some day will be—do not
support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our cases
require.”121  Justice Scalia also rejected the petitioners’ claim that the
ESA’s citizen-suit provision, quoted above, created in all persons a
right to challenge the failure of a funding agency to consult with the
Secretary of the Interior.122
Scalia criticized the analysis used by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which had denied the government’s
motion for summary judgment on standing.  He stated:
To understand the remarkable nature of [the Eighth Circuit]
holding one must be clear about what it does not rest upon: This is
not a case where plaintiffs are seeking to enforce a procedural
requirement the disregard of which could impair a separate
concrete interest of theirs (e.g., the procedural requirement for a
hearing prior to denial of their license application, or the
procedural requirement for an environmental impact statement
before a federal facility is constructed next door to them).  Nor is it
simply a case where concrete injury has been suffered by many
persons, as in mass fraud or mass tort situations.  Nor, finally, is it
the unusual case in which Congress has created a concrete private
interest in the outcome of a suit against a private party for the
Government’s benefit, by providing a cash bounty for the victorious
plaintiff.  Rather, the court held that the injury-in-fact requirement
had been satisfied by congressional conferral upon all persons of an
abstract, self-contained, noninstrumental “right” to have the
Executive observe the procedures required by law.  We reject this
view.123
The Lujan Court presented no fewer than three competing
visions of the appropriate contours of statutory standing doctrine.  At
the opposite end of the spectrum from that of Scalia, Justice
Blackmun, writing in dissent and joined by Justice O’Connor (who
authored the Allen decision), explained why the standing denial
actually undermines, rather than furthers, separation of powers:
The Court expresses concern that allowing judicial enforcement of
“agencies’ observance of a particular, statutorily prescribed
procedure” would “transfer from the President to the courts the
120. See id. at 564.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 567.
123. Id. at 572-73 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).
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Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed,’ Art. II, § 3.”. . . In fact, the
principal effect of foreclosing judicial enforcement of such
procedures is to transfer power into the hands of the Executive at
the expense—not of the courts—but of Congress, from which that
power originates and emanates.124
In this analysis, the relevant test of standing is whether it furthers
the enforcement objectives of the enacting Congress.  Critical to the
analysis, however, is Blackmun’s implicit assumption that the median
member of the Congress that passed the ESA supported the most
ambitious citizen-suit enforcement action that could be presented
under its liberal standing provision.  In contrast, Justice Scalia is
dismissive of the citizen standing provision, unless the claimant
relying upon it presents an injury that is more akin to one recognized
at common law.  This need not be a substantive injury.  But for Scalia,
a procedural injury must also satisfy a traditional model of limited
judicial lawmaking, in which rectifying the claimed deficiency has
some meaningful linkage to an underlying substantive injury.  On the
case facts, Scalia found the claimed procedural injury wanting.
Finally, Justice Kennedy offered a third, intermediate position:
In my view, Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate
chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where
none existed before, and I do not read the Court’s opinion to
suggest a contrary view. . . . In exercising this power, however,
Congress must at the very least identify the injury it seeks to
vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to
bring suit.125
While Kennedy tried to strike a middle ground between the
Scalia and Blackmun opinions, his suggested compromise would
appear to render Lujan fairly inconsequential.126 It might appear that
even if the Court had not retrenched from its holding in Lujan in the
more recent Laidlaw decision, Congress could have avoided the
Lujan result.  To do so, Congress only needed to define as injured
persons who are interested in visiting locations in which federal
agency funding, in violation of the ESA, threatens the habitats of
endangered species, and who have even de minimus evidence of an
intent to travel to those locations.  While the Kennedy opinion
appears to represent a plausible middle ground, and perhaps the
124. Id. at 602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
126. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory Universe, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y F. 247, 258 (2001) (discussing the disagreement between Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence and Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion regarding the redressability issue).
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median position on the Lujan Court, the fact remains that with the
exception of the part of his opinion that addressed the issue of
redressability, Justice Scalia wrote for a majority in Lujan.
Lujan appears anomalous in that it limits judicial lawmaking in
an effort to protect Congress’s power to achieve an appropriate
consensus on the underlying environmental policy questions in the
future.  But it does so by thwarting Congress’s consensus with respect
to environmental policy—in the form of a liberal grant of standing—
achieved in the past. In doing so, the Lujan opinion appears to blur—
perhaps deliberately—the historical distinction between
constitutional and statutory standing. This is perhaps most evident
when we compare a well known assertion about statutory standing
made by Justice Marshall in the 1973 decision, Linda R.S. v. Richard
D.,127 with an assertion by Justice Scalia in Lujan itself.  In Linda R.S.,
Justice Marshall stated that: “Congress may enact statutes creating
legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no
injury would exist without the statute.”128  In effect, Justice Marshall
recognized the peculiarity of using the Court’s emerging limits on
standing, which operated to prevent the Court from creating law in
place of Congress and which Congress might find itself unable to
supplant,129 to prevent Congress itself from defining novel statutory
injuries.  In marked contrast, in Lujan, Justice Scalia asserted that
“there is absolutely no basis for making the Article III inquiry [on
injury in fact] turn on the source of the asserted right.”130  In effect,
Justice Scalia thwarted the legislative compromise that produced
citizen standing by insisting upon an injury analogous to one at
common law.
It is more difficult in Lujan than in Raines to determine whether
the litigation is consistent with or in violation of expectations of the
median member of the enacting Congress simply because those
presenting the suit were not obviously on the losing side of the
approved legislation.  In fact, by bringing a suit that furthered the
overall objectives of the ESA (albeit more ambitiously than the
median member of the enacting Congress might have preferred), the
Lujan claimants sided with the successful coalition that enacted the
127. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
128. 410 U.S. at 617 n.3.
129. For an analysis of how the various negative legislative checkpoints can effectively
prevent Congress from enacting legislation, even for which there is a strong overall consensus,
see Stearns, supra note 60.
130. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 576.
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statute.  But because the suit sought to force interagency consultation,
the Court might well have used the reluctance of the agency itself to
construe the statute as the litigants preferred as a proxy—albeit an
imperfect one—for median legislative expectations.  At one level, any
citizen suit would appear to defy agency preferences if for no other
reason than that the agency had been notified and had declined to act
in place of the private litigant.  But in Lujan, the Secretary of the
Interior was the defendant.  As a result, the agency had lined up in
direct opposition to the preferred resolution sought by the citizen
plaintiff.  In that context, the Court might have been particularly
reticent to allow a citizen-suit plaintiff, even with the statutory
standing conferral, to supplant what appeared to be a valuable proxy
for Congressional expectations.  As discussed below, one difficulty
with Lujan’s doctrinal resolution is that by imposing rigorous
common law-based requirements for injury, the Court invited, as
shown in Bennett v. Spear,131 a result that risked thwarting
Congressional expectations in the opposite direction, thus allowing
suits that actually undermine rather than further the overall purpose
of the environmental statute, when the claim satisfies a common law
understanding of injury.
C.  Bennett v. Spear
In the 1997 decision, Bennett v. Spear,132 Justice Scalia, writing for
a unanimous Court, applied a zone of interest analysis to confer
standing using the same statutory standing provision under which the
Lujan Court denied standing.  And in doing so, he allowed the
claimants to undermine, rather than further, the overall objectives of
the ESA.
The Bennett Court granted standing to two Oregon irrigation
districts and to the operators of two ranches within those districts who
sought to use the ESA to restrict the authority of the Fish and
Wildlife Service (Service), as delegated to the Secretary of the
Interior, to protect the habitats of endangered species.  In Bennett,
the Service had issued a Biological Opinion (Opinion) in accordance
with the ESA concerning the operation of the Klamath Irrigation
Project (Project) by the Bureau of Reclamation and the impact of
that project on two listed endangered species of fish, the Lost River
131. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
132. Portions of this discussion and analysis are based upon the presentation in STEARNS,
supra note 4, at ch. 6.
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sucker and the shortnose sucker.133 The Secretary of the Interior
undertook the Project and the Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau)
administered it under the Secretary’s jurisdiction. In 1992, the Bureau
notified the Service that the Project might adversely affect the two
listed species of fish.  After the required consultation with the
Bureau, the Service issued its Opinion, as required under the ESA,
concluding that the “long-term operation of the Klamath Project was
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the Lost River and
shortnose suckers.”134  The Opinion further identified “reasonable and
prudent alternatives,” most notably maintaining minimum water
levels in the Clear Lake and the Gerber reservoirs, which the Service
concluded would avoid this danger. After receiving the Opinion, the
Bureau notified the Service that it intended to operate the Project in
compliance with the recommendations.135
The petitioners, who claimed a competing interest in the water
that the Opinion declared necessary to the preservation of the
endangered fish, alleged that the required maintenance of minimum
water levels for the Clear Lake and the Gerber reservoirs violated § 7
of the ESA.136  Petitioners alleged that the Service had implicitly
determined the critical habitat of the endangered fish without first
giving adequate consideration to the economic impact of that
designation, in violation of § 4 of the ESA.137  Petitioners sued the
regional director of the Service and the Secretary of the Interior,
relying for standing upon both the ESA’s broadly worded standing
provision and § 10 (a) of the Administrative Procedures Act.138
The District Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed,
holding that only litigants seeking to preserve endangered species or
their habitats fell within the zone of interest of the ESA’s citizen-suit
provision.139  The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the Ninth
Circuit’s zone of interest analysis, and further rejecting three
alternative defenses offered by the government to deny standing.140
While the Ninth Circuit construed the scope of the citizen-suit
133. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 157.
134. See id. at 159.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 160.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 175.
139. See id. at 160.
140. See id. at 166-74.
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provision in light of the overall purpose of the ESA, Justice Scalia
strictly construed the terms of the citizen-suit provision, eschewing
any inquiry into how that provision fit within the overall scheme of
the statute.141 The citizen-suit provision states in relevant part:
any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf—
(a) to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other
governmental instrumentality or agency . . . who is alleged to be in
violation of any provision of this chapter or regulation issued under
the authority thereof; or
. . .
(c) against the Secretary [of Commerce or the Interior] where there
is alleged a failure of the Secretary to perform any act or duty
under section 1533 of this title which is not discretionary with the
Secretary.142
Writing for the Bennett Court, Justice Scalia described the citizen-suit
provision’s “remarkable breadth,” as compared with statutory
standing provisions generally, and even when compared with the
generally broader environmental standing provisions.143  Justice
Scalia’s rejoinder to the Ninth Circuit’s reliance upon his own opinion
in Lujan is at the very least ironic.  The Ninth Circuit relied upon
Lujan for the proposition that, its broad language notwithstanding,
the ESA citizen-suit provision was not intended to confer standing
upon any conceivable litigant.  Thus, the Ninth Circuit stated: “As
Lujan makes clear, Congress may not permit suits by those who fail
141. The Bennett Court relied upon two earlier cases, Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), and Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497
U.S. 871 (1990), for the proposition that:
Whether a plaintiff’s interest is “arguably . . . protected . . . by the statute” within the
meaning of the zone-of-interests test is to be determined not by reference to the
overall purpose of the Act in question (here, species preservation), but by reference to
the particular provision of law upon which the plaintiff relies.
Bennett, 520 U.S. at 175-76.  In contrast, the Ninth Circuit maintained that the overall weight of
authority was contrary.  See Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915, 919-22 (9th Cir. 1995) (collecting
authorities), cert. granted 517 U.S. 1102 (1996), rev’d sub nom. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154
(1997).  The Ninth Circuit analysis found support in Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass’n, 479 U.S.
388 (1987), in which the Court stated that the zone of interest test “denies a right of review if the
plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the
statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.”  See
Plenert, 63 F.3d at 917-18 (quoting Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399).  Thus, the Ninth Circuit reasoned
that “the statutory purposes should be divined by considering the particular statutory provision
that underlies the complaint within ‘the overall context’ of the act itself.”  See Plenert, 63 F.3d at
918.  At a minimum, this zone of interest analysis appears to be more consistent with the pre-
Lujan understanding that the purpose of standing is to determine whether Congress intended to
allow the claimant to pursue his statutory cause of action in federal court.
142. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 165 n.2 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)).
143. See supra note 72 (quoting relevant discussion from Bennett opinion).
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to satisfy the constitutionally-mandated standing requirements. For
that reason, suits under the ESA, no less than suits under any statute,
are clearly not available to ‘any person’ in the broadest possible sense
of that term.”144
In contrast, Justice Scalia, writing for the Bennett Court, relied
upon Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,145 a case which
vindicated a nontraditional statutory injury of the sort called into
question in Lujan, this time to confer standing upon plaintiffs whose
interests, he admitted, were generally inconsistent with the ESA’s
overall purpose.146
This irony might help to explain the decision of the liberal and
moderate justices to join Scalia’s decision in Bennett. While the Lujan
Court denied standing to environmental plaintiffs on the ground that
none of the three articulated nexus theories sufficed to establish a
meaningful interest in furthering the habitats of endangered species
abroad, the Bennett Court expressly rejected such limitations on
environmental injuries. Thus, writing for the Bennett Court, Justice
Scalia stated:
Our readiness to take the term “any person” at face value is greatly
augmented by two interrelated considerations: that the overall
subject matter of the legislation is the environment (a matter in
which it is common to think all persons have an interest) and that
the obvious purpose of the particular provision in question is to
encourage enforcement by so-called “private attorneys
general”. . . .147
One difficulty with the Bennett analysis is that whether or not it is
common to think that all persons have an interest in the environment,
the Bennett Court conferred standing to plaintiffs seeking to limit the
application of a federal statute to protect the environment.  Thus, in
rejecting standing, the Ninth Circuit reasoned:
We do not believe that in setting forth the factors to be weighed in
formulating a plan for protecting species, Congress intended to do
144. See Plenert, 63 F.3d at 918 n.4 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 570-
80 (1992)).
145. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
146. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 175 (conceding that while plaintiffs’ interests were economic, the
“overall purpose of the [ESA]” is “species preservation”).  In Trafficante, the Supreme Court
conferred standing under the Fair Housing Act upon housing testers challenging the
dissemination of nontruthful housing information based upon race, even though the testers
themselves were not in the market for housing.  See 409 U.S. at 210-11.  The Bennett Court
stated that Trafficante established that by using appropriate statutory language, Congress can
expand standing to the “full extent permitted under Article III.”  See 520 U.S. at 165-66.
147. 520 U.S. at 165.
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more than ensure rational decision-making by providing guidance
for government officials. Certainly, it did not intend impliedly to
confer standing on every plaintiff who could conceivably claim that
the failure to consider one of those factors adversely affected him.
To interpret the statute [otherwise] would be to transform
provisions designed to further species protection into the means to
frustrate that very goal.148
In contrast, Justice Scalia relied upon administrative law
principles to assert that one need not allege an ultimate injury to
claim the protections of a procedural statutory provision.149 Instead,
Scalia reasoned that petitioners had standing to challenge the failure
of the Service, in issuing its Opinion, to consider the environmental
impact of its decision, as required by statute.
The model developed above suggests that Bennett likely
thwarted the expectations of the median member of the enacting
Congress, given that she would not have supported the ESA with the
understanding that the citizen standing provision would be used to
frustrate, rather than to advance, the central purpose of the statute.
In effect, by limiting the zone of interest analysis to the particular
provision upon which claimants relied for standing and then coupling
that analysis with a common law understanding of injury, the Bennett
Court identified a justiciable injury for purposes of standing that had
a perverse connection with the statute’s overall purpose.  At the same
time, however, Justice Scalia’s analysis could be read to endorse a
more liberal understanding of citizen standing provisions generally,
thus encouraging the liberal and moderate members of the Court to
join.  While the decision might have appeared to be a defeat for those
seeking to use the ESA to further environmental interests, by
endorsing Trafficante and suggesting a generalizable interest in the
environment, it also had the effect of suggesting that Congress retains
some of its pre-Lujan powers to define injury in a novel manner.150
Moreover, because the decision was largely based upon the
prudential zone of interest analysis, it left the door open for Congress
to revisit the holding and to restrict standing according to whether
future claimants sought to further or undermine the statute’s overall
objectives.
148. Plenert, 63 F.3d at 921-22 (internal citations omitted).
149. Thus, Justice Scalia stated: “[i]t is rudimentary administrative law that discretion as to
the substance of the ultimate decision does not confer discretion to ignore the required
procedures of decisionmaking.”  Bennett, 520 U.S. at 172.
150. 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (stating that the Court could give “vitality” to the Fair
Housing Act only by granting broad standing to those who had suffered discrimination).
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We will now consider the Supreme Court’s two most recent
prominent statutory standing decisions.  In Steel Company v. Citizens
for a Better Environment,151 the Court focused upon redressability to
deny standing, while in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services, Inc.,152 the Court issued an about-face with
respect to much of its restrictive post-Lujan statutory standing
jurisprudence.
D.  Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment
While Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment was
decided by a majority and was unanimous on the judgment, it was
sharply divided on an antecedent jurisdictional question.  The Court
splintered on whether it had the authority to resolve the relatively
easy question whether respondent had stated a valid statutory cause
of action prior to resolving the substantially more difficult question of
Article III standing.153  For present purposes, the Court’s less than
definitive resolution of this question concerning the doctrine of
“hypothetical jurisdiction,” is less important than is the merits of the
Article III standing issue.  The constitutional standing question
presents a valuable illustration of the potentially divergent
enforcement signals presented by the EPA on the one hand and
private litigants on the other.
Respondents, an association of private persons interested in
environmental protection, brought a private enforcement action
151. 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
152. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
153. Justice Scalia managed to cobble together a majority opinion, which was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, and in part by Justice
Breyer.  Justice Scalia held that the Court is obligated to resolve the Article III issue prior to
resolving the statutory issue.  And yet, Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, both of
whom formed part of the majority, wrote a separate concurrence in which she stated that the
majority opinion should not be read as presenting an exhaustive list of the conditions that would
justify a departure from the usual sequence in which the Court determines Article III standing
prior to the merits of the suit.  Justice Breyer, who joined only part of the Scalia opinion,
concurred in part and concurred in the judgment in part, and Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Souter, also concurred in the judgment.  These four justices would have allowed the Court to
resolve the relatively easy statutory question, which they also viewed as jurisdictional and thus
with an equal claim to priority, first, as a means of avoiding the significantly more difficult
Article III question.  Thus, while Justice Scalia wrote for a majority, the median position on the
Court is likely represented in the separate O’Connor opinion.  Justice O’Connor suggested that
she would not afford Congress the same free reign as would Justice Breyer and those who
refused to join the Scalia opinion altogether in preliminarily considering the statutory issue.  But
O’Connor further withheld judgment on whether a broader set of circumstances than Scalia
suggested justify departing from the Court’s usual insistence upon resolving the existence of
Article III standing prior to considering the merits of the underlying statutory issue.
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under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
of 1986 (EPCRA), against a small manufacturing company in
Chicago.154  The EPCRA sets out a number of reporting requirements
for users of specified toxic and hazardous chemicals, including annual
filings.155  While the EPA is actively involved in enforcing the
EPCRA, the Steel Company Court explained that “[f]or purposes of
this case, . . . the crucial enforcement mechanism is the citizen-suit
provision.”156
After receiving the required notice of intent to sue, the EPA
declined to sue on its own behalf, although the United States later
filed an amicus supporting the citizen suit.157  By the time the citizen-
suit complaint was filed, Steel Company’s filings were current.  Steel
Company therefore moved to dismiss, alleging that the court lacked
jurisdiction under Article III and that because the statute does not
allow suit for purely historical violations, respondents had failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.158  The District Court
granted the motion, agreeing with Steel Company on both grounds.159
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed.160  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.161
In part IV of his opinion, which was written for a majority of six,
and which did not prompt the separate opinions among those who
joined and wrote separate concurrences, Justice Scalia declined to
reach the question whether being deprived of information that was
supposed to have been disclosed in the company’s filings constitutes a
justiciable injury.162  Instead, Justice Scalia concluded that the
allegations did not satisfy the Article III requirement of
redressability.  After reviewing the allegations in the complaint,
Justice Scalia concluded: “None of the specific items of relief sought,
and none that we can envision as ‘appropriate’ under the general
request, would serve to reimburse respondent for losses caused by the
154. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 86.
155. See id.
156. The provision, as quoted by the Steel Company Court, states: “‘any person may
commence a civil action on his own behalf against . . . an owner or operator of a facility for
failure,’ among other things, to ‘complete and submit an inventory form under section 11022(a)
of this title . . . [and] section 11023(a) of this title.”  Id. at 87.
157. See id. at 130 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
158. See id. at 88.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 88-89.
162. See id. at 103-06.
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late reporting, or to eliminate any effects of that late reporting upon
respondent.”163  Because there was no question that petitioner had
filed reports late, Scalia concluded that a declaratory judgment was
valueless, not only to the respondents, but to “all the world.”164  More
importantly, the claimed damages would not redress respondents’
injuries because under the statute they were payable to the U.S.
Treasury rather than to the respondents.  In rejecting this claim to
redress, Scalia stated:
[A]lthough a suitor may derive great comfort and joy from the fact
that the United States Treasury is not cheated, that a wrongdoer
gets his just deserts, or that the nation’s laws are faithfully enforced,
that psychic satisfaction is not an acceptable Article III remedy
because it does not redress a cognizable Article III injury.165
In an opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Stevens, who
had argued against reaching the merits of the Article III standing
question, given that respondents had not stated a valid cause of action
under the statute,166 went on to reject the Court’s redressability
analysis on two grounds.  First, he noted that in all prior cases in
which the Court had suggested a problem of redressability, the root of
the difficulty was that the claimant was seeking relief from a
government law or practice, the ultimate effect of which involved the
conduct of nonlitigants.167  Never before had the Court imposed this
requirement as a barrier to litigation against a present private litigant.
Second, and more importantly, Justice Stevens rejected the argument
that payment to the U.S. Treasury did not create a meaningful form
of redress.  Thus, he stated: “When one private party is injured by
another, the injury can be redressed in at least two ways: by awarding
compensatory damages or by imposing a sanction on the wrongdoer
163. Id. at 105.
164. See id. at 106.
165. Id. at 107.  Scalia also rejected the claim that reimbursement of costs and fees provided
redressability adequate for Article III purposes on the ground that one cannot seek standing to
bring suit for the cost of the suit itself.  He rejected the remaining claims to injunctive relief on
the ground that they were premised upon continuing injuries, which respondents did not claim.
See id. at 108-09.
166. Because the statute framed the requirement of a cause of action in jurisdictional terms,
Justice Stevens concluded that the jurisdictional questions of Article III standing and the
existence of a valid statutory cause of action had equal priority for judicial resolution.  See id. at
112-13 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
167. This was the difficulty, for example, in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); see also
supra Part I (comparing Allen with Board of Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978)).
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that will minimize the risk that the harm-causing conduct will be
repeated.”168
To support the latter point, Justice Stevens relied upon the well
supported claim of legal historians that modern notions of
justiciability have no antecedents in the framing or early-
constitutional periods.169  Thus, Justice Stevens explained:
History supports the proposition that punishment or deterrence can
redress an injury.  In past centuries in England, . . . and in the
United States, private persons regularly prosecuted criminal cases.
The interest in punishing the defendant and deterring violations of
law by the defendant and others was sufficient to support the
“standing” of the private prosecutor even if the only remedy was
the sentencing of the defendant to jail or to the gallows.170
Stevens concluded that “[g]iven this history, the Framers of
Article III would surely have considered such proceedings to be
‘Cases’ that would ‘redress’ an injury even though the party bringing
suit did not receive any monetary compensation.”171  Finally, Justice
Stevens observed that because the EPCRA also provides
enforcement authority to state and local governments, the Court’s
constricted understanding of redress would appear to prevent those
governments from having standing, given that any resulting fines
would be paid to the U.S. Treasury.172
The Steel Company case helps to focus on two important
anomalies in recent statutory standing jurisprudence.  First, as stated
in the introduction and summarized in the excerpts from Justice
Stevens’s opinion, modern justiciability concepts appear to be in
tension with early litigation which allowed private persons to enforce,
among other claims, criminal laws for which the litigant would not
receive any direct form of redress, other than knowing that the
wrongdoer is punished.  And yet, Justice Scalia, who has fashioned
himself as an originalist, has implicitly rejected just this historical
argument, stating that the “psychic satisfaction” associated with
knowing that a “wrongdoer gets his just deserts, or that the nation’s
168. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 127 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
169. See supra note 5.
170. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
171. Id.
172. See id. at 128-29 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).  Justice Stevens noted that
preventing other governments from enforcing these laws might be justified on separation of
powers grounds under the take care clause, but then questioned how this concern could justify
limiting standing in the present suit.  See id. at 129 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
Justice Scalia responded by insisting that the Court’s holding was grounded in Article III, rather
than Article II.  See id. at 116 n.4.
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laws are faithfully enforced,” is insufficient to support redressability
under Article III.173  Second, from a policy perspective, as Justice
Stevens notes, it is not clear why allowing direct compensation, if only
of a peppercorn, should matter for Article III purposes.174
As before, considering this case from the perspective of the
differential signal that EPA versus citizen-suit enforcement sends to
the Court relative to the preferences of the median member of the
enacting Congress might help to explain these anomalies.  While a
detailed historical analysis is beyond the scope of this article, it is
worth considering whether those categories of cases that are often
relied upon to refute modern standing developments involve the
kinds of claims that are plausibly intended to create favorable paths
of case law or to create a greater level of enforcement than
anticipated under the law.  Instead, local private prosecutions that
defied modern justiciability norms were likely the product of an
historical period before the professionalization of prosecutorial
functions, which generally began to emerge around the 19th
century.175  Such suits might also have reflected the relatively weaker
communications of local offenses to the sovereign than is routinely
the case today, and indeed, as is a statutory prerequisite to the
exercise of citizen standing.
In Steel Company, for example, we know that the EPA was
notified and declined to bring suit.  While the United States backed
the respondent as a friend of the Court, the fact remains that when
presented with the opportunity to bring suit against a prior violator
who was then coming into full compliance with the EPCRA, the EPA
declined.  This might not be surprising.  If the EPA is concerned with
using its limited resources to ensure that the laws are complied with,
there would be little justification in expending resources on those who
are going to be in compliance by the time the complaint is filed.
Finally, Justice Stevens is certainly correct that from the perspective
of Article III redressability it would appear to make little sense to
allow private compensation of a peppercorn, but to disallow
substantial fines to be paid to the U.S. Treasury.  But the standing
denial does not preclude Congress from coming back and correcting
173. See id. at 107.
174. See id.
175. See generally ALLEN STEINBERG, TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PHILADELPHIA, 1800-1880 230-31 (1989) (describing transformation from private settlement to
plea bargaining with professionalization of prosecutorial functions in mid-19th century
Philadelphia).
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the ruling by adding a modest compensatory provision (other than
lawyers fees).  Nor, of course, does it preclude the EPA from
reaching a different decision should a similar case present itself in the
future.  In contrast, had the Court allowed standing (setting aside the
weakness of the underlying substantive claim), it risked endorsing a
more ambitious level of enforcement than the median member of the
enacting Congress might have preferred.
E.  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.176
The Supreme Court’s most recent major pronouncement on
statutory standing is Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services, Inc.  Laidlaw was initially conceived as a
mootness case, but Justice Ginsburg, writing for a majority of seven,
effectively transformed the case into one about Article III standing.
In doing so, Justice Ginsburg marked a wholesale retreat from much
of the underlying logic of Lujan and Steel Company177
Laidlaw arose under the Clean Water Act (CWA),178 which
confers standing upon any “citizen,” defined as “a person or persons
having an interest which is or may be adversely affected,”179 to
challenge violations of the CWA in federal district court.  The CWA
provides for injunctive relief and civil penalties payable to the U.S.
Treasury.  The CWA also allows successful citizen claimants to
recover costs, including reasonable attorneys fees.  Pursuant to the
CWA, the Laidlaw plaintiffs, Friends of the Earth (FOE) and
Citizens Local Environmental Action Network (CLEAN), sought an
injunction against Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. (Laidlaw),
and civil penalties payable to the U.S. Treasury, following Laidlaw’s
repeated violations of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
(NPDES) permits.180
176. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
177. Justices Stevens and Kennedy joined the majority, but also filed separate concurrences,
and Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented.
178. Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994).
179. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), (g) (1994).
180. As required by statute, plaintiffs provided the requisite 60 days notice to the EPA, to
the state in which the permit violations occurred, and to Laidlaw.  As the Laidlaw Court
explained: “The purpose of notice to the alleged violator is to give it an opportunity to bring
itself into complete compliance with the Act and thus . . . render unnecessary a citizen suit.”  528
U.S. at 175 (quoting Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49,
60 (1987)).  If the EPA or the state initiates suit and is “diligently prosecuting,” the citizen suit is
then barred.  The reverse does not hold; if the citizen suit proceeds following the required notice
period, the EPA or state agency is free to intervene in the suit.
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In 1986, Laidlaw purchased a hazardous waste incinerator
facility, including a wastewater treatment plant, in Roebuck, South
Carolina.  Shortly thereafter, the South Carolina Department of
Health and Environmental Control (DHEC), granted Laidlaw a
permit authorizing the discharge of treated water into the North
Tyger River, effective January 1, 1987.  In addition to regulating other
aspects of its effluents, the permit limited the discharge of certain
pollutants into the river, including the highly toxic mercury.181  Upon
receiving the permit, Laidlaw began to discharge various pollutants.
In doing so, Laidlaw repeatedly exceeded its permit limits for
mercury emissions.182
In April 1992, FOE and CLEAN, later joined by Sierra Club,
sent the required notification of intent to sue under the CWA.
Laidlaw’s lawyer responded by asking DHEC to consider suing
Laidlaw, and DHEC agreed.  Laidlaw drafted the DHEC complaint
and paid the filing fee.  Laidlaw and DHEC then “settled” with
Laidlaw agreeing to pay $100,000 in civil penalties, and further
agreeing to make “every effort” to comply with the permit
requirements.  In June 1992, FOE filed suit against Laidlaw, alleging
a failure to comply with the permit requirements, and seeking
injunctive relief and civil penalties.  Laidlaw moved for summary
judgment on the ground that FOE had failed to allege an injury in
fact, and thus that it lacked Article III standing.
Upon considering various affidavits from FOE and CLEAN
members, described below, the District Court concluded that FOE
had standing “albeit by the very slimmest of margins.”183  Laidlaw also
moved to dismiss on the ground that the DHEC prosecution barred
the suit, a motion that the United States, acting as amicus curiae,
opposed.  The District Court rejected the motion on the ground that
the DHEC action had not been “diligently prosecuted,” as required
to bar a citizen suit under the CWA.  The District Court noted that
between the time that FOE initiated the suit and the time the court
had rendered its judgment, Laidlaw had committed 13 mercury
181. The imposed mercury emissions limit was apparently based upon a series of
interpretive and calculation errors, and resulted in a level that would be sufficiently safe for
drinking water.  For a discussion, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Issues Raised by Friends of the
Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services: Access to the Courts for Environmental Plaintiffs, 11
DUKE ENVTL. L & POL’Y F. 207, 233-35 (2001) (citing Supreme Court Brief Amicus Curiae of
the State of South Carolina, and the District Court opinion).
182. The Court stated that between 1987 and 1995, Laidlaw violated its mercury limits on
489 occasions.  See 528 U.S. at 176.
183. See id. at 177 (internal quotations omitted).
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discharge violations, 13 monitoring violations, and 10 reporting
violations.  While the District Court declined to enter injunctive
relief, it assessed damages based upon its assessment of the economic
benefit to Laidlaw and the total deterrent effect, after employing the
statutory criteria.184
FOE appealed the monetary judgment but not the denial of
injunctive relief.185  The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit dismissed the suit on the ground that it had become
moot.  Relying upon Steel Company, the circuit court reasoned that
the elements of Article III standing must persist at every stage of the
litigation, and that civil penalties paid to the U.S. Treasury would not
redress any injury that FOE suffered.  After the circuit court issued
its decision, but before the Supreme Court granted certiorari, Laidlaw
permanently closed its Roebuck incinerator facility, thus ceasing any
permit violations.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
the split between the Fourth Circuit and the other circuits that had
addressed the question whether defendant’s compliance with its
permit after commencement of litigation moots a claim for civil
penalties under the CWA.186
Justice Ginsburg ultimately rejected the mootness challenge on
the ground that defendant’s voluntary cessation of unlawful conduct,
which had the potential to resume, was inadequate as a mooting
event.187  Having rejected mootness, Justice Ginsburg asserted that
she was obligated to resolve the question of Article III standing.188  In
arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to allege sufficient injury to
support standing, Justice Ginsburg explained, Laidlaw relied upon the
184. The District Court calculated the economic benefit to Laidlaw to be $1,092,581 and
assessed a civil penalty of $405,800.  See id. at 178.
185. Laidlaw cross-appealed, alleging a lack of standing and claiming that the suit was
barred based upon the diligently prosecuted DHEC action.  See id. at 179.
186. See id. at 179-80.
187. Justice Ginsburg noted that assuming the Roebuck facility was closed, Laidlaw retained
a valid permit, which would presumably allow it to reopen and resume operations at some
future time.  See id. at 193-94.
188. See id. at 180.  As Justice Scalia noted in dissent, while the District Court found
standing by an apparently slim margin in 1993, that was  “long before the court’s 1997
conclusion that Laidlaw’s discharges did not harm the environment.”  See id. at 201 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).  Justice Scalia added: “As we have previously recognized, an initial conclusion that
plaintiffs have standing is subject to reexamination, particularly if later evidence proves
inconsistent with that conclusion.”  Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In this case, because the Court of
Appeals determined the case to be moot, it had not passed on the question of injury in fact for
purposes of standing, which proved critical to Ginsburg’s analysis.  While the mootness issue is
important in its own right, I will limit the analysis in the text to the issue of statutory standing,
except as necessary to lay a foundation for the standing issue.
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District Court’s findings used to support its penalty assessment that
“there had been no demonstrated proof of harm to the environment
from Laidlaw’s mercury discharge violations.”189  One of the central
issues in the debate over standing between Justices Ginsburg and
Scalia was whether proof of harm to the environment leading to a
personal injury was a prerequisite to Article III standing.  Justice
Scalia maintained that if Laidlaw had not caused harm to the
environment, then a citizen-suit claimant seeking relief for Laidlaw’s
unlawful emissions generally cannot have suffered a harm sufficient
to satisfy the injury requirement under Article III.  Thus, Scalia
stated:
Typically, an environmental plaintiff claiming injury due to
discharges in violation of the Clean Water Act argues that the
discharges harm the environment, and that the harm to the
environment injures him.  This route to injury is barred in the
present case, however, since the District Court concluded after
considering all the evidence that there had been no demonstrated
proof of harm to the environment. . . .190
Justice Scalia went on to state that “[w]hile it is perhaps possible
that a plaintiff could be harmed even though the environment was
not, such a plaintiff would have the burden of articulating and
demonstrating the nature of that injury.”191
In contrast, Justice Ginsburg’s analysis began with the following
alternative premise:
The relevant showing for purposes of Article III standing . . . is not
injury to the environment but injury to the plaintiff.  To insist upon
the former rather than the latter . . . is to raise the standing hurdle
higher than the necessary showing for success on the merits in an
action alleging noncompliance with an NPDES permit.192
Based upon the affidavits submitted by FOE, CLEAN, and
Sierra Club, Justice Ginsburg found a sufficient injury to support
Article III standing, arising from Laidlaw’s discharges prior to the
alleged mooting event.
FOE member Kenneth Lee Curtis averred that he lived near the
Laidlaw facility and that although he would have liked to fish, camp,
or swim within 3 to 15 miles of the facility as he had done as a child,
189. See id. at 181.
190. Id. at 199 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
191. Id.  As explained below, this might help to explain the relationship between Laidlaw
and Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978), another
case in which the Court found standing.
192. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181.
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he chose not to because of his concerns about Laidlaw’s discharges
and because the river “looked and smelled polluted.”193  CLEAN
member Angela Patterson averred that she lived near the facility and
that although she once enjoyed picnicking, walking, birdwatching
near the river, and wading in the river, she chose not to do so because
she “was concerned about the harmful effects from discharged
pollutants.”194  Patterson further averred that although she and her
husband would have liked to have purchased a home near the river,
they chose not to, in part, because of Laidlaw’s discharges.  CLEAN
member Judy Pruitt averred that she lived near the river where she
would have liked to fish, hike, and picnic, but did not do so because of
the discharges.195  FOE member Linda Moore attested that she lived
20 miles from the Roebuck facility and would have used the river for
recreational purposes had she not been “concerned that the water
contained harmful pollutants.”196  CLEAN member Gail Lee alleged
that her home had a lower value than that of similar homes located
farther from the river, and that “she believed the pollutant discharges
accounted for some of the discrepancy.”197  Finally, Sierra Club
member Norman Sharp averred that he no longer canoed
downstream from the Roebuck facility because he was “concerned
that the water contained harmful pollutants.”198
With the possible exception of Gail Lee, all of the remaining
affiants and deponents are similar to those who were found to have
alleged insufficient injuries to support Article III standing just eight
years earlier in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.  Gail Lee’s affidavit is
notably different in that it contained an allegation that had the
potential to break the causal chain inherent in Justice Scalia’s
argument that begins with a violation that causes harm to the
environment which leads to harm to the claimant, thus producing an
Article III injury. While Justice Scalia apparently found the Gail Lee
affidavit deficient, he did leave open the possibility that an affidavit
like Lee’s might supplant this presumed line of causation.
Assume, for example, that Gail Lee had been able to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that although the Laidlaw discharges
produced no discernible environmental harm, the attendant publicity
193. See id.
194. See id. at 182.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See id. at 182-83.
198. See id. at 183.
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following its unlawful discharges resulted in a demonstrable reduction
in the value of her home.  If so, then even without any discernible
harm to the environment, Lee would have been able to allege a
justiciable injury, which would presumably satisfy even Justice
Scalia’s strict standing analysis.  This harm, which is akin to a
common law injury and thus consistent with Justice Scalia’s analyses
in both Lujan and Bennett, would exist in a manner that was entirely
independent of the scientific validity of any claim concerning the
alleged harm of the Laidlaw discharges.  Instead, the harm would
arise because of the perception of harm in the market which resulted
from those discharges and which would plausibly be redressed by a
Court order enjoining those discharges or by imposing civil damages
of a sufficient magnitude to prevent a recurrence of voluntarily
ceased activity.  And this holds even if any and all claims to
environmental harm are deficient.
This analysis is substantially similar to that which ultimately
prevailed in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc.199  In Duke Power Co., the plaintiffs, who challenged the
constitutionality of the $560 million liability cap for nuclear accidents
contained in the Price Anderson Act lived near a proposed nuclear
power plant.  The Duke Power Co. case also thwarted the chain from
a violation to harm to the environment to harm to the plaintiff to
Article III injury.  The Duke Power Co. plaintiffs, once granted
standing, could ultimately have lost on the merits as they actually did,
thus leaving the cap in place.  And even if they had succeeded on the
merits, it remained possible that with the liability cap lifted, and thus
with unlimited liability in the event of a nuclear accident, the plant
would still have been built.  Nevertheless, at least part of their
claimed injury, namely the present decline in property values, existed
independently of any proof of environmental harm, or even of their
ultimate success on the merits.  The diminished likelihood of the
plant’s construction once liability was lifted had the potential to
restore at least some of the lost property value.  And the Duke Power
Co. plaintiffs were entitled to seek to redress of that injury.  I have
previously explained that the social choice model of standing helps to
explain Duke Power Co.200  While that case, along with Allen and
Bakke, falls into the “no right to an undistorted market” category, the
Court found standing because it was apparent that the litigants were
199. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
200. See Stearns, Standing and Social Choice, supra note 2; see also supra Part I
(summarizing model).
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seeking to secure concrete relief, in spite of, rather than because of,
the need to make law to resolve the dispute.
Gail Lee’s affidavit might have fallen into this category, and
could perhaps have satisfied Justice Scalia’s exception to insisting
upon injury to the environment as a precondition to citizen standing,
but for the arguably vague nature of her averment: “she believed the
pollutant discharges accounted for some of the discrepancy.”201  The
attenuated nature of her allegation likely prevented Justice Scalia, but
not the Laidlaw majority, from affording Gail Lee standing.
In addition to the problem of injury, Laidlaw further presented a
problem of redress.  Although the plaintiffs might have had standing
to challenge the denial of injunctive relief, they had not appealed that
denial.  Civil damages would have been paid to the U.S. Treasury.
Relying in part upon congressional findings, Justice Ginsburg
determined that the deterrent effect of such damages was sufficient to
support the Article III redressability requirement.202  In finding
redressability satisfied, Justice Ginsburg distinguished Steel Company
on the ground that that case involved wholly past violations, as
opposed to violations that were ongoing at the time the complaint
was filed.203
Setting aside Gail Lee, the remaining affiants alleged harm that
resulted from unlawful discharges that the District Court found had
produced no discernible environmental harm.  The Supreme Court
did not upset that finding.  And yet, unlike in Lujan, the Laidlaw
majority found standing.  Two questions then arise.  First, can Lujan
and Laidlaw be reconciled, and second, if not, which is more
consistent with the social choice model?  To answer these questions, it
will be helpful to compare the postures of the United States in the
two cases.
As Justice Ginsburg noted in response to Justice Scalia’s
allegation that the decision threatened to undermine democratic
principles of governance,204 the Department of Justice sided with the
201. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 182-83 (emphasis added).
202. See id. at 184-85.  Ginsburg stated: “Congress has found that civil penalties in Clean
Water Act cases do more than promote immediate compliance by limiting the defendant’s
economic incentive to delay its attainment of permit limits; they also deter future violations.
This congressional determination warrants judicial attention and respect.”  Id. at 185.
203. See id. at 187-88.
204. Justice Scalia had stated: “The new standing law that the Court makes—like all
expansions of standing beyond the traditional constitutional limits—has grave implications for
democratic governance.”  Id. at 202 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Laidlaw plaintiffs on the issue of standing.205  In contrast, the
Department of the Interior, acting as defendant in Lujan, sought to
bar standing.  It certainly will not do to suggest that wherever the
government comes out on standing resolves the constitutional
standing issue.  Such a suggestion would substitute an Article III
requirement for a pure exercise of agency discretion.  But the
difference between the government positions in Lujan and Laidlaw
was more profound, and likely affected the perception of at least
some justices as to the location of the preference of the median
member of the enacting Congress with respect to the Endangered
Species Act and the Clean Water Act, respectively.
In Lujan, the citizen claimants sought to affect directly the
government’s interpretation and application of an environmental
statute, and they did so in a context that involved governmental
funding of foreign development projects.  In contrast, the citizen
claimants in Laidlaw sought to ensure private compliance with a
state-issued permit.  To the extent that the relevant federal agency
position on standing—Department of the Interior in Lujan and EPA
in Laidlaw—and more to the point, federal agency policies under the
statute, serve as a meaningful proxy for what the median member of
the enacting Congress intended, or at least was willing to condone,
the two cases could justifiably be distinguished.  After all, while it is
not possible to know with certainty what the median member of the
enacting Congress actually would have preferred when evaluating the
application of a statute to previously unknown facts, we do know that
the federal agency is subject to substantial political pressures and
resource constraints that vary considerably from those of the citizen
plaintiff.  We also know that a federal agency can back a citizen suit
easily and at a low cost.  After all, doing so allows the agency to
appear more moderate in its own enforcement actions, while it
encourages others to pursue more zealous enforcement.  But when
the agency itself is on the line and is defending against a citizen suit,
this might provide the best available proxy for the contrary
expectations of the median member of the enacting Congress.206
205. Id. at 188 n.4.
206. In his dissenting opinion in Laidlaw, Justice Scalia makes a substantially similar point:
The Court points out that the government is allowed to intervene in a citizen suit, . . .
but this power to “bring the Government’s views to the attention of the court,” . . . is
[a] meager substitute for the power to decide whether prosecution will occur.  Indeed,
according the Chief Executive of the United States the ability to intervene does no
more than place him on a par with John Q. Public, who can intervene—whether the
government likes it or not—when the United States files suit.
Id. at 209 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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I do not wish to oversell the above distinction between Lujan
and Laidlaw.  The fact remains that the two cases are in significant
tension and that the Court has issued two sharply opposed decisions
in a very short period of time.  Both Lujan and Laidlaw present
plaintiffs who, it can be argued, have suffered no personal or direct
injury, but who are concerned about technical violations of federal
environmental laws that have not (yet) been shown to have caused
any actual harm to the environment.  Justice Ginsburg is certainly
correct that standing should turn on the injury to the claimant, rather
than to the environment.  And as I have argued, there exists a
category of claimants who could satisfy this criterion in a meaningful
way.  An injury to property value, as seen in Duke Power Co., would
certainly suffice.  But setting aside Gail Lee’s affidavit, there was no
averment that obviously compelled a departure from the more
common chain of an unlawful act causing harm to the environment
causing harm to the claimant creating Article III standing.  Instead,
given the absence of any discernible environmental harm, the claimed
injuries could credibly be categorized as psychological, and the
underlying litigation as ideologically motivated.  And herein lies the
real difficulty.
Congress has the power to define such injuries as justiciable and
to provide a statutory means of redressing them.  This much was
apparent from Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lujan (assuming as
seems probable that he was the median justice on the Lujan Court),
and is all the more evident from Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion
in Laidlaw.  But it is difficult, perhaps ultimately impossible, for those
justices who are motivated to do so, to actually determine the intent
of the median member of the enacting Congress.  That is because
while the Clean Water Act, for example, confers standing liberally, it
has done so for reasons that reflect an expansion of the underlying
issue spectrum beyond a straightforward determination of the
preferred level of compliance.  Instead, as part of a complex scheme
of negotiations that were necessary to secure the passage of that, or
any other, statute that confers standing broadly, the bill sponsor
assembled a coalition that simultaneously preserved the bill’s overall
objectives and secured enough votes. It is possible that the relevant
bargaining occurred across no fewer than three issue dimensions, as
explained in Part II, but even if we were to limit our inquiry to two
issue dimensions, substantive bargaining and bargaining over
standing, that alone would be sufficient to prevent the Court from
ascertaining with any reasonable degree of certainty, which proxy—
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the citizen suit or the failure of the governing agency to sue instead—
is most meaningful in assessing the preferred position of the median
member of the enacting Congress.  In the end, just as the Court
cannot know what Congress really “intended” when bargaining
occurs across more dimensions than one, we cannot predict with any
reasonable degree of certainty how the median members of the Court
will respond when sent conflicting signals about the intended
enforcement of a statute that confers standing broadly.
My own view is that we are watching a work in progress, and
frankly, one that might not admit of a truly stable resolution.  Thus
far, the Court has vacillated on whether it is willing to become the
vehicle for resolving open questions regarding the optimal
enforcement of federal environmental statutes, when in doing so it
risks condoning a level of enforcement that is at odds with the
preferred position of the median member of the enacting Congress.
When the Court faced a similar set of concerns in the nondelegation
context, it ultimately capitulated to Congress.  Whether its apparent
willingness to do so in the context of statutory standing, as seen in
Laidlaw, represents a stable outcome, however, remains to be seen.
CONCLUSION
While it is customary in at least a good many law review articles
to tie a neat bow around a newly advanced thesis, I will not afford
myself that luxury here.  The best I can do is identify those factors
that give rise to what I consider to be an uncertain state surrounding
the doctrine of statutory standing.  But all is not lost.  After all, if we
can identify the causes of doctrinal instability, then living with the
resulting uncertainty becomes more tolerable.  At a minimum, we can
gain increased respect for those who are confronted with the very
difficult questions that the sorts of cases discussed in Part III pose,
even while we are frustrated with their inability to provide us with
clear guidance.  I hope that this article has provided some insight into
how the nature of collective decision making, both in Congress and in
the Supreme Court, has affected, and might well affect in the future,
this increasingly important body of developing law.
